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On September 95, 1861, Lieutenant General Edmund Kirby
Smith reported to his new command at the Department of East
Tennessee.

It was a troubled command; Kirby Smith's insuf-

ficient army was pressed from the north by Brigadier General
George Morgan, and from the west by Major General Don Carlos
Buell.

To save his command from certain defeat at the hands

of the superior Union armies, Kirby Smith was able to convince
General Braxton Bragg to move his army by rail to East Tennessee.
Through a series of political maneuvers, Kirby Smith
obtained a portion of Bragg's army and entered Kentucky on
August 14, 1862.
to follow.

Bragg, with the remainder of his army, was

The plan was for the two Confederate armies to

bring an indecisive Kentucky into the Confederacy, obtain
Kentucky recruits, and combine to defeat Buell (who was of
course obligated to defend Kentucky against the invading armies).
At the same time, Major Generals Sterling Price and Earl
Van Dorn were to move eastward from West Tennessee and capture
Nasvville--the South would be free of Union forces.
Kirby Smith moved rapidly northward, defeating a small
Union force at Richmond Kentucky on August 30.
iv

He continued

on to capture Lexington and Frankfort on September 2 and 3.
Bragg--with Buell closely behind--marched toward Bowling
Green, and on to Yunfordville, turning eastward off the
Louisville road to Bardstown.

Buell marched into Louisville

on September 30 unopposed.
Not expecting Buell to leave Louisville for several
weeks, Kirby Smith and Bragg delayed concentration to carry
on the necessary administrative iuties of occupying the state.
But Buell was able to coordinate his forces and move out of
Louisville in only three days.

Buell's plan called for a

feint to be sent toward Kirby Smith at Lexington to keep the
two Confederate armies divided.

The main Union army was to

move in three parts, toward Bardstown.

The plan was success-

ful; the Confederate commanders were confused by the feint
and remained divided.

The Confederate main force at Eards-

town retreated before the three pronged Union attack, taking
a stand at Perryville on October 9.

During the battle Bragg's

army was able to push back a portion of the Union force, but-finding that they were severely outnumbered—the Confederates
left the battlefield the next day.

Kirby Smith remained in

and around Frankfort, unaz.le to coordinate his army with Bragg's.
Finding that Price and Van Dorn had been defeated at
Corinth Mississippi, out of provisions, and unable to recruit,
Bragg and Kirby Smith decided to abandon Kentucky.

The two

armies retreated from the state, arriving in East Tennessee
the last of October.

CHAPTER ONE
IN EAST TEI:NESSEE
In July of 1861, during the Civil War's first major
encounter, the arrival of a brigade of raw troops led by
Brigadier General Edmund Kirby Smith aided in turning the
tide at Manassas.

His timely arrival led to presidential

recognition and increased military status.

Having recovered

from a nearly fatal wound and recently married, Kirby Smith
became a popular figure in Virginia; his wife was styled as
the bride of the Confederacy as the couple ascended the
Richmond social ranks.'
While Kirby Smith was recovering from his wounds, he
was being considered for a position in Jefferson Davis' reconstructed departmental system.

The shift in structure, neces-

sitated by a greater need for defensive planning, called for
several new departments to be organized.

Kirby Smith was,

at first, considered to relieve General Braxton Bragg as defender of Pensacola Harbor, but the Unionist activities in
eastern Tennessee demanded more immediate attention.

On Sep-

tember 25, Lieutenant General Kirby Smith established his
headquarters at Knoxville as commander of the Department of
East Tennessee, the newest addition to Jefferson Davis' de-

1. Joseph H. Parks, General Edmund Kirby Smith. C.S.A.
(Baton Rouge, 1954), 136-37; Dunbar Rowland, Jefferson Davis,
Constitutionalist; His Letters, P=,pers and Speeches, (10 vols.
Jackson, Miss., 1926), IV, 493. For an account of Kirby
Smith's activities at Manassas, see Douglas Southall Freeman,
Lee's Lieutenantsj A Study in Command, (3 vols. New York,
1942), I, 83-84.
1

partmentul system.
The Confederate de artmental

ystem

as a complicated ar-

rangement designed to organize the Confederacy into areas of
defensive commands, with the eventual intention of lecalizing
forces and logistics into a single area.

The defense of the

departmental areas was often accomplished through the use of
districts or subdistricts to defend strategic locations, railroads or haruors.

:he theory yielded considerable autonomy

to the various departmental commanders, making each commanding
officer responsible for military planning and logistics within his department.

Through such a system, the hichmond govern-

ment hoped to be able to deal with the growing magnitude of
the war.3
In the fall of 16b1, General Albert Sydney Johnston replaced Major Cfeneral Leonidas Polk as commander of the Lepertment of the West.

In January of the next year, Johnston's

main focus of command was distributed along a line from Fort
Eonelson and Fort Henry In West Tennessee to bowling Green,
tentucky, and on into eastern Kentucky.

Outflanked by the Fed-

eral victories at Mill springs, and Forts Henry and Donelson,
the Confederates were forced to abandon this defensive line in
order to deal more effectively with the advancing Federal armies
Following the shiloh defeat, Davis saw a need for reor-

2. The War of the hebellions A Compilation of the Ufficial
hecords of the Union and Confederate Armies (120 vols., Washington, 1680-1901), Ser. I, Vol. VII, 908. Hereafter cited as
Oh. Ibid., Vol. VI, 788-89; Parks, Kirby smith, 155.
Thomas Lawrence Connelly and Archer Jones, The Politics
).
of Command (baton houge, 1973), 88-69.

3
ganization of the departmental system to accomodate the reed
for reinforcement and more efficient logistical planning.
The Department of Alabama arid West Florida was incorporated
into the western department creating an extremely large
command encompassing the states of Alabama, Mississippi,
Middle and eastern Tennessee, in addition to parts of Georgia,
Florida, and Louisiana.

The new department retained its old

name and was defended through its military organ, the Army
of Tennessee.

With Johnston's death at Shiloh, General

P.G.T. Beauregard commanded the western department until
June when he was removed for abandoning territory and replaced by Braxton Bragg.
The attempt at consolidation in the West was somewhat
reversed when Davis complicated the system by creating the
Department of East Tennessee under Kirby Smith.

The new

department was to be independent in both command and logistics,
but Davis suggested a certain amount of cooperation between
Kirby Smith and the western department commanders.

Tne East

Tennessee command ranged along a defensive line from Cumberland Gap, through Knoxville and or to Chattanooga.

The de-

partment was established to protect against a Federal advance into the Southeast, but restraint of Unionist activity
and protection of the vital East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad were also to be given particular priority.

The rail-

4. Ibid., 100-103; Stanley F. Horn, Army of Tennessee
(Norman, Okla., 1955), 155; Kenneth P. Williams, Lincoln Finds
a General; A Military Study of the Civi] War (5 vols., New York,
lc, 6). IV, 4-4.

road was a vital east-west link throuh the South, and nad
been repeatedly severed by the area's Unionist element.

hichmond

felt that a strong, gallant figure such as Kirby --,mith could
diminish such activity and organize the area for a cooperative
military effort.5
The new commander had no desire to leave his command In
Virginia, of which he later referred to as "the Halcyon days
of my service.

He was even more hesitant to take command

of a weak defensive department in a disloyal region of the
Confederacy.

Although discontented In his new position, the

strateeic importance of the Department of East Tennessee soon
became evident and he prepared to put his new command into
6
order.
Of the many problems to be dealt with in East fennessee,
the Unionist element was the most pressing.

The new commander's

initial impression was that they were "an ignorant, irimitive people," dominated by the Federal army.

Among the new

commander's first acts were to force an oath upon the county
officials, execute twenty bridge burners and declare martial
law throughout the sector.

Kirby Smith's first, seemingly

Thomas Lawrence Connelly, Army of the Heartland (baton
houge, 1967). 1671 Connelly and Jones, Politics of Comman4,
55-56, 91-92, 106; OR , Ser. I, Vol. X, pt. 1, 303; Vol. VII,
257-58.

5.

6. 2a,, Ser. I, Vol. XIV, pt. 3, 948; Parks, Kirby,
Smith, 156; r_dmund Kirby Smith, "Kentucky Campaign Notes,"
Kirby Smith Papers (outhern Historical Collection, University
of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C.).

5
harsh, actions soon became more indulgent as many loyali ts
fled thrra,
with the

rid the new com7rander became more involved
ctiviti, s of the (leiyartment.

In a proc-

lamation of mid-April, Kirby smith allowed those guilty of
treasonable L.cts to take an oath to ti-,e Confederacy and, in
having done so, be exhonorated for past crimes.
svsith later reported thmt nis attempts
activity in East fennessee were

i_rby

o quell the trasonous

l-eatly successful, citing the

lecrultmnt of at least two Confederate regiments from the
region.7
"ith the local populace finally under a degree of control,
the young co7.mnder could turn his attention to more pressing
military responsibilities,
troops,

in command of less than 0,000

escribed by thPir commander as "a disorganized mob,"

Kirby Smith felt that the defense of his department was less
than eflective.

In an attempt to hasten relief for his prob-

lem, Kirby Smith asked th

—iartment for an excnange of

all_gedly disloyal troops for men of unquestionable dependability.

Nen of disloyal character, it was felt, would be

less active in pro-7onfederate surroundings, and the request
iNas sustained.

Ihe disloysl members of Kirby _mith's command

i.sze removed to the eastern theater, ..rd in return, General
Josepn

. Johnston forwarded three ley 1 regiments.

7. s2h,, ::er. I, Vol. X, pt. 2, 385-86, 402; Ser.
Vol. I, 881; Kirby Smith to wife, June 25, 1062, Kirby smith
Papers.
E.

0h.c.

20-21; pt7.-2.
-

I, Vol. X, pt. 2, j07-)08, 305-86; IA, 1,

397-98.

6

'Jy mid-April, Kirby
ade4uatc.

f. o:s ;.re still ni.'hly in-

rem comander's April

1'

jen-

Ort

eIal Danville Leadnetter, con ,.rding
bride, with a total

01

1,;506 men.

Fifty-secon,.1 Georgia
rhis force was

as "unarmed," yet it was tne major sLrength 6uardihk, Chattane
oc,a.

."rigudier
General Carter Ltevensones Forty-second

GeorAia

4nd

Thirty-sixth Tennessee rez-iments were in occu-

pation of Cu7;loerland Gap vith a force tot,111.6 2,763, but vIc.i.t
described as "badly

r_isted in

a

sinilar nanner

irigidier General 3.M. oarton's 1,618 Tennesseans, assined
to tne defense of the headqurrs

at

Knoxville.

,_).des were listed as "partly and baaly armed,

Other bri-

and were

spread throuc,hout the repartment engaged in variou.: L:Lties.
The total present for duty was a meager 9,787.9
The Federal
as weak.

ces opi_osing Kiray :,mith were not ner1;'
/

In the we:,tern z‘rJater the Federal troops, under

the command of 1-1jor Ceneral

had concen-

trated at Corinth fo1lowin6 :he campaiwn which culminated
in the b-Attle of Lhiloh.
of

the Union forces were in control

A.ssouri, .:id.41e Tennessee, northern Alab ,- tma, northern

Mississippi and northern Arkansas.
-

re 'eerphis and tne 'assiesippi

to Vicksbur6.
Vir6inia to
co. i.nd

9.

Also under

iver fro-a St. Louis

ken advantat,e of activity in

Halleck

ivide

OC:

•

1.it 24,000 men, under the

of ::ajor General Don Carlos zAfell, ecross northern

Ibid., pt. 2, 476.

7

A1;,.bA7_1.-J.

into Fast Tenness e with the eventuAl oujective of
Ch.ttAnoogu, an oJviously weak point in thc. ConfedIn mid-Jun , thu1l was Issued orders tht

ert1_, 4 efenses.

itrd An inten:;e 1er'.er 1 Awarene

!ovirl., on Ch...tooc,u

the Confederute defensive
27.27 -re on

A

lirect lin

of tne weuThesses in

rust

girbg

to Atlanta.

10
abandon Lust Tennessee or b.. CA tured."

J.4 June

'0, the

ur7iy was at duntsvillsJ, Jeriously threutenin.: ChttanooL7-..

IOU

. ennessee,
La.st .

n

ue1l sed An unstoppable threat to

J.rby

A.41nst such An army.

wIthL;i6ht not he forced to stAnd Alone
L4C,(:.00 Confederates

irALif„, co71.

ut Tupelo, might possibly b

positioned to intercept Juell

before tne blue columns reuen-A Chattanoo6a.11
71rby 7 -111th's mh,jor concern .as certainly for the, overr=71erl force conc ntrAtina at Huntsville, Jut enely
Activity in thP northern .,:ctor of hic, deprtrzent copelled
the yount, commander to split :he effective strength of his
dj inade4uute force in the face of u two promzed _ttt_tc:L.
lieneral Geori.,e J. Mcr:.an, a

c,-)mmand of _)rliz

;Atte -7k t to outflAnk ';,ne Conf r'erute stronghold At
fere-el 71roy 3rnith to abandon the ChattanooEu

Cumberhind

,Iily to refend tt ro-!t:,ern

1,ne ter-.
-le,rtment.

10.

In an -Jt':-Ipt to

Vol. -VI.

30•
11.

Io1 4., pt.

eliew

t. 2.

9.

.,.treiTity of

his

pre.,sure from Kirby

kt.

8

_mith's advancing force, Mo-an sug ested to ,his superiors
that a movement against Chattanooga would
iv, tment of Cumoerland sap.14

Upon reaching tne nortnern

i-rimeter of hie :]eprtment,

3mith was informed tnat

tl detacement from
o

column under the command

!ajor General 0.11. Iviitchell

ohattanooga.

..reatly aid his

_s seriously threatening

In a desperate at,empt to hold the town, Kirby

_mith sent reinforcements to the hardpressed Leadoetter, and
informed eichmond of nis v?rilous position.

".2he force from

:Addle :ennessee, actin), in concert 1,ith that on The Kentucy
linE . . . places me in an unf,vorable situation."

Fearing

for the lose of one of the two stratecic points, the commander
continue-- ;

To ccncentrate at either . . . involves the aoan-

Thnment of Cumberland Gap or Chattanoo

"13

As nothing further developed on tne Chattanooga line,

.Urby Smith returned his troops to the defense of Cumberland
Gap on June

Three days lat-r, having received informaticn

that Mitchell was again striking at Chattanooga, he directed
his forces southward, and en route receiv€.
! the encourai:Ang
ners tnat reinforcemeLts from I'1eria would soon join hiln.
He arrived at Chattanooga in tim

to avert disaster, only

to receive the disturoing news tnat Morgan had successfully
outflanked the Cunberi

7,ap position.

21sgruntled, Kirby

mith rushed aid to ::t(venson, but before the reinforcements

12.
13.

role., vol.

",

Z04; Parks, Kirby )
- rtith, 177-78.

I, Vol. X, pt. L,

96-97.

9
could produce an effect, Leadbetter hastily reported a third
full scale threat before Chattanooga.

Not sufficertly capa-

ble of defending both strategic ends of his line of defense,
Kirby Smith resolved to abandon Cumberland Gap in favor of
the more strategically important point at Chattanooga.

To

surrender Chattanooga was to abandon the only direct rail
connection from the Southeast to the Department of the West
and the Army of Northern Virginia.

Federal control of Chat-

tanooga would jeopardize Atlanta and much of the valuable
Southeast.

Cumberland Gap was important to the grand strategy

of the Richmond authorities, but as the Confederate defensive
line had been forced to move southward, Chattanooga possessed
14
strategic priority.
Although Morgan controlled the northern perimeter of the
Department of East Tennessee, Kirby Smith felt more secure
in the defense of Chattanooga.

This, coupled with

he arrival

of the two Florida regiments, gave Kirby Smith the manpower
and confidence needed to delay Buell's advance on Chattanooga.
During the difficult times in mid-July, Kirby Smith
made several futile attempts to secure reinforcements.

Cr

July 12, he wired Brigadier General Humphrey Marshall--jr
command of the Department of Western Virginia--for aid in

14. Ibid., pt. 1, 905, 956-58; pt. 2, 597-98, 677-78,
682-84. For the importance of Chattanooga and the Southeast,
see Frank Vandiver, Ploughshares Into Swords: Josiah Gorgas
and Confederate Ordnance (Austin, 1952), 121-22; Robert C.
Black III, Railroads of the Confederacy (Chapel Hill, 1952),
5-6, 181.

•oii

" of Cumberl_.1.1
1th notifi

octh thr

cf :11.7% latcr

r Depart-ntrit

ii involved in - r

en tne

.;
to mez.t

tricr forces in .:est

-..nswered that 'ne could be of no st;:‘, 17:icarlt
July 20, only five days
:
, ':istch,

.-..eckzi
.
a..t of

Jr

:.:_ton

'lamed t..!s tr

c ommander of the Department of t:-:e

ore sensitive

thun .beaure,. Ard to the import=ince of CLAttanooga
TenneL.see, iru

oc

LtAi

Last

ns to aid the itrny of i:.ast

'Tennessee _.nd its new commar -l er.
cne

initiAl functions as comm...r.de.r of

.r.cstern

t cent isas

i-atch

Forrest to Kirbi

-1-1.

rI61%.dier :_teneral 1than

1Z)

Accompanied by only

stcJf, i- orrest's reuz.
,s16nmEnt could not
tual reinforcel:ent L,
- ut

I.;.Ls

the

sLall

considered Ltn

intended to aid in the oi- z,ani-

zation of an €L'ective cvlry force in eastern
lerinez,see.
In this endeavor, iorrest wuz eminently successful.
one month, he had forged Kirby

e::.isting cavalry iLto

an effective fi 'hting force -Khich struck silently 44nd
Duell

s

ly lines.

hit..in

iuickly

Tj- pifyin6 the Confc :crate cavalry

style. Forrest cut telec,r_:.1:-. lines ,and rendered the
and Chattanooga Railrcytd n, „rly useless to
zorrest
rair'ed

15.

t5 far eust

uell's advance.

the- outskirts of Nashville

a , jer. I, V(A. XVI, pt. 2, 660-81, 695.

throwing the town and Governor Andrew Johnson into rits of
panic.

At the pinnacle of his successful ride, Forrest sur-

prised the Federal garrison at Murfresboro, capturing its
1,400 defenders on July 13.

In his assignment to delay

buell's advance on Chattanooga, Forrest was characteristically
ccf,ssful.
Athoue,h somewhat confident In his defense against
citcell's -mati force, Kirby ';Allith intensely feared the
p

buell's ,ltire army from Huntsville.

r

Having

only beer. delayed by Forrest, the Federals were again pushrepairing the damaged Nashville and Chattanooga

ir

hailroad as they advanced.

Kirby .Jmith frantically tele-

graphed Bragg that "an immediate re-enforcement of at least
two brigades is necessary to insure" the defense of Chattanooga
and East Tennessee.'
In further attempts to secure aid, Kirby .)mith also
notified the governor of :eorgia, the War Department, and even
President Davis of his needs.

Joseph E. brown, the governor

of Georgia, was of some aid, sending two poorly armed regiments.

both Davis and

che War Department were again sympatnetic,

but with the war focused in the East, '..hey could do no more
than ask Bragg to stnd relief if possibl -

To accommodate

16. J.h. Chumney, Jr., "Don Carlos buell, Gentleman
General," (doctoral dissertation, hice University, 1904), 110;
hopert Selph henry, First With the Most: Forrest (Indianapolis,
1944), 87-911 Oh., ,:er. I, Vol.
pt. 1, 35.
17.

Black, hailroads, 100-01.
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MOVEMENT OF BRAGG'S ARMY FROM TUPELO TO CHATTANOOGA

flanking strategy.

This first attempt at mass movement of

troops over a great distance by rail was not only successful but highly innovative.

It led to more extended use of

rail systems by botn armies before the end of the war.19
Although not desiring the weak and defensive East 2ennessee command, Kirby Smith, in his first few months in command, had proven himself successful.

He was reasonably

able to contain the pro-Union element within his department
despite the delicacy of the situation.

Although his posi-

tion at Cumberland Gap had been turned, he was able to hold
Chattanooga and the vital East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad against superior forces.

With Brag6's rapid movement

from Tupelo, Buell's advance had been halted, easing the
continual strain on Chattanooea and the ..)outheast.
beselged by ambition lind desire and having tired of
defensive tactics, Kirby Smith was beginning to formulate
acditional plans.

With bragg at Chattanooga and his army

considerably reinforced, Kirby .Aalth began offensive planning.
In an exhibition of ambition and offensive desire, he wrote
to his wife In early July of his coming reinforcements

nd

his exaggerated ability to "carry tne war into Africa."20

19.
20.
Papers.

Black, Railroads, 1o2.
Kirby Dmith to wife, July 2, ldb2, Kirby Smith

:AC

rilE

riAJE POLICY

In the early summer of 1862, the tide of the war appeared
to be turning in f-vor cf t.-.e southern cause.

In the 1:ast,

Union forces on tne PeninsuL4 were successfully out-maneuvered
by Confederate forces und,r

obef- t h. Lee, who soon emer.Led

us the outstandin6 milit try fi,;.ure on the eastern front.
1%3tonewa11" Jackson hal .scnd.1 to prominence, as had the
hard riding cavalrymen undir the com,7;!:nd of J.L.D.
In the West, conditions were not as hopeful.

the Confederate

military effort at 6hilon had failed to halt continued Federal victories in the Mississippi Valley.

'ith Union forces

in occupation of parts of Alabama, Arkansas, nssissippi,
Louisiana, :Assouri, 1.nd T nnessce, the future of the Confederate cuse in the 4est seemed dim.

Of the many problems fac-

in6 the Confederate westrn defenses, ut tnt time, the 1;roblem of a strayed Kentucky was one of the most serious.
Kentucky had sevr.rely di

tppointed the Confederate ,ov-

rnmcnt when it refused to sec._:(4_ in 1061.

The state's fail-

ing attempt at neutrality Ald subse4uent Unionist stand nad
denied the southern armies a defense line on the Ohio
forcing them to take a stand farLner to the south.1

iver,
the for-

mer commander of thr :;.F:ntucky state militia, Drigadier General :Amon iolivar .Azckner, 1-d in the opinion that the

1. h. Merton Coulter,
(ivil ,.r and headlustment in
Kent,cky (Chapel Hill, 1926), 14.

15

Kentuckians were pro-southern and should be released from subAs Confederate commander of the Kentucky forces oc-

jection.

cupying Bowling Green in the fall of 1861, he issued an ineffectual proclamation asking for Confederate support from the
2
state.

The commander in the West, Albert Sydney Johnston,

issued a similar proclamation written by Jefferson Davis ackrowledging Kentucky's proclaimed neutrality.

With his army

in occupation of the southern part of the state, Johnston
reported that he had invaded KentuPky in self-defense and
would drive the Federals from the state and retire himself.
If, of course, the Kentuckians wished to "unite their fortunes
with the Confederate states." they would be welcomed into
the fold.

In October, John C. Breckinridge, who had left

his Senate seat to take up the Confederate cause, issued
another proclamation comparing the state's position of neu4
trality to that of the "prostrate and bleeding Maryland."
Invading from eastern Tennessee in December, 1861, General
Feliz Zollicoffer again offered Kentucky the opportunity to
rally to the Confederate standard, to which there was little
or no reaction.'

A fifth offer to join the rebellion was

?. OR., ir. I, Vol. IV, 413-14; Arndt Stickles, Simon
Bolivar Buckner; Borderland Knight (Chapel Hill, 1940), 70-91,
98.
3.

OR.. Ser. I. Vol. VI, 411-12, 420.

4. Frank K. Moore, ed., Rebellion Record: A Diary of
American Events With Documents, Narratives Illustrative Incidents, Poetry, Etc. (11 vols., New York, 1861-68), III, 257.
5.

OR., Ser. I, Vol. VII, 787.
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present,' by
1- ter, but

:.7
.q.j0T Griril

GE-.0rFr

. Crittenden one month

ptin reeults were negligible.

_till, A.ch-7.on7; centinurd to bell(ve th't Kentucky was

!-.1e
(rnnt

in bon'77ae.

cpvember, ial, a provisional

In

establish(- r7

OohnLAon was appointed

ov-

GF,or6e W.
.clii,rnor,

capital was established at

the Cenf(derate state
:;reen.7

Although this

Lovernment was admitted into the Confederacy, it was of little
significance as thr Frankfort government continued its
tence

in the Federal structure.

Exis-

_,eeminc;ly satisfid th t

Kentucky was a rlemb,r
of the Confederacy, Davis, thrctOlout
the

looked upon the

will of tnt: icople.
v1sona' government

Lte as being occupie

rie continued to view the

,_ainst the
entucky

ro-

similar to the deposed i.7overnment of

of Tennessee, ths true representative of tne
,eoplc,

hose hearts were 1.ith the a'.outh.8

Therefere,

7uvis contihuLilly looked to l
- epose Andrew johnscn from behind
his personal fortifications at Nashville. he nearly always
approved any means of liberating the reople of Kentucky.
. Kirby _71 h ._tsk,i1 for the opportunity, DrAvis

as posi-

tive in his answer.
In nopes of testing both Federal strength and Kentucky
sentimemt, John Hunt Morgan

E.

Ibid

7.

Coulter, Civil War

as sent into Ktntucky during the

Vol. L::. pt. 2, 2.50-52.
LeadJustTent, 138.

B. IlowLknO, ed., Davis. V. 313. Davis refers to "the
liberati(Al of fennessee and K-ntucky."

summer of 1062.

Commanding only 900 men, he initiated a spec-

tacular raid, driving halfway across the state.

In only ten

c:ays, he was able to capture ten cities, numerous stores, and
effectually disrupt buell's supply lines oetween Louisville
and Nashville.9
Morgan's successes caused much anxiety within the
eral ranks.

ed-

iuell was forced to abandon the offensive at

Chattanooga, and fall back to protect his supply lines."
The obvious evidence of the inadequate military strength
in Kentucky compelled iue1l to detach additional troops under
one of his best subordinates—Major General William Nelson-to reorganize the existing forces against further assault."
On July 13, Lincoln wrote Halleck of his concern over the
embarrassing raids

"They are having a stampede in Kentucky.

Please see to it."12

brigadier General Jeremiah Boyle, the

I.ederal commander at Louisville, exagerated the problem to
:3ecretary of War William .tanton six days later: "The state
is In imminent danger of being overrun . .

.

If glorga7

should succeed in a fight with our forces there is danger of

9. Aiu, er. I. Vol. k‘iI, pt. 1, 767-68. For an account
of Morgan's first Kentucky raid, see Cecil Yletcher Holland,
Morgan and His Raiders (New lork, 1942), 117-)1.

10.

oer. I,

forced to retreat.
Ibid., pt, 2, 207.

Vol. kVI, pt. 1, 110, 15d. buell was
His force was concentrated at Dehard.

11.

Ibid., pt. 2,

12.

Ibid., 73b.

35/.
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un uprising . . • ."13
On July 16, with his force only fourteen miles from the
state's capital, Morgan telegraphed a significant report to
Kirby .Dmith in iast fennesseel
I um here with a force sufficient to hold all the country outside Lexington and Frankfort.
rnese places are
garrisoned cniefly with Home Guards. fhe whole country
can be seured, and 25,000 or 30,000 men will join you
at once.14

Morgan's invitation was somewhat premature.

He nad re-

ceived no more than three hundred volunteers, and he had been
forced to withdraw from the bluegrass even before Kirby .Alith
received the dispatch.15

What Morgan mistook for southern

sympathy among the state's people was actually romantic popularity for the dashing Kentuckian and nis flamboyant horsemen.
As Morgan continually eluded the much larger, and seemingly
hapless Federal army, the popular attraction was strengthened.10
Of no less importance, the Federal forces had reached a low
point in the public sentiment due to the oppressive activities
of Doyle and other Federal commanders in the state.17

13.

Ibid., 741.

14.

Ibid., 733-34.-

15.

Holland, Morgan, 126-"e7.

16.

Coulter, Civil War and headjustment, 165.

17. Connelly and Jones, Politics of Commend, 74. Doyle
had arrested many southern sympathizers. humors of slavery
emancipation in Kentucky caused much unfavoraule feeling, even
among Kentucky Unionists. Also, there was much discontent with
kederal military interference in local elections. Coulter,
Civil War and headjustment, 151-52, 155, 156-o5.

70
Morgan's report of an undefended Kentucky and his badly
mistaken assumption of Confederate enlistment possibilities
delighted Kirby :;mith.

Throuhout most of July he had con-

templated an offensive campaign, and Morgan's success in
Kentucky would allow reality to evolve from speculation.
early as July 6, he notified brLAgg that he was preparin
move against George Morgan at Cumberland Gap.10
day Kirby

As
to

The next

irtith notified 6tevenson of the plan, adding that

if the movement against the Gap was successful, there would
be tne possibility of a further advance into Kentucky. 19
Anile making these plans to leave his department for an offensive campaign, Kirby 6mith was facing 50,000 Federal
troops
threatening Chattanooga.20

,

knew the importance of his

department and was obviously aware that iragg would not allow
it to ue captured without resistance.

As bragg began sending

reinforcements from Corinth on July 3, it became evident
to
Kirby -;m1th that bragg would soon be in a position to halt
uuell's advance.

The distribution of Kirby ,Jmith's forces

exemplified his disregard for the Chattanooga defense line
that he had displayed u
month uefore.

so extremely important just one

.
- tevenson's well armed division of 9,000 was

stationed at Cumberland :rap before George Morgan's force
of
10,000.

At Chattanooga, to face :511e11, Kirby .-Anith positioned

16.

Uh, ser. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 2, 723.

19.

Ibid., 734.

20. bold., 120-21. Total effective force is given at
b),)60. This total excludes George Morgan's torce
at Cumberland Gap.

•,nothr

tr,:cps.

htnry

this force, led byL:;r1-Idler .;, nerul

:ajor

.L1 J. E. .-cCown, wus the-

ade4uute of

most in-

,r.tirt command."

with his major L:trength concentrat-A before Cumber1H,
C;up, Kirby smith ca:npal ned to exptdite sragg's evehta_11 novmrnt to Cfrattancoga.

On July 4, he wrote 3ragg that ;;Ilell's
2

entire force had crossed the lennessee

On July 14,

he wired Davis that the Fedrrul force before Chattanooga was
"cvcrwhelming . . .
cooperation."23

27.7r1,47 cannot

be resisted except by 3ragg'8

Five days later, he notified Inspector Gen-

eral .amuel Cooper in zlichmond that 13uel1's "whole force
. . . giaa7 expected daily to attack Chattanooga," und that
the safety of that city "depends upon Liraggtj cooperation.""
Cn July 24, unaware that the Army of the Nis issippi was
already en route to Chattanooga, Kirby 5mith made a final
attempt to accelerate thra,:z's movement to the cast Tennessee
front.

In a lengthy dispatch to Jrag,g covering u variety

of topics, Kirby :;mith pledged to "cheerfully place my command under your orders."25

That day, with 50,V0 Federals

threatening the most importnt extremity of his department,
and without knowledge of irages initial movements to

21. Connelly, Armi of t,-,(
Vol. i,V1, k t. 2, 72t-L7,
P-r. I, Vol.
726,7.

4).

'Dia..

44.

Ibid., 729.

25.

IalL, 734-35.

%.

_er. I

71).

22

Chatt,
.1noo,a, Kirby L7ith notified

i v nson to crepare fer

possible inv sion of K. ntueky."
z_tve josse%sed a

Kirby

e_:nuine concern fer ,-e fate of Last Tennee

the evi:t_rxe seems overwhelming that he intended to force
ragg to defend Chattanooga, and with Juell in check, free
himself for an in7'..ependent invasion of K, ntuc,:y.
Unaware of Kirby 3m1th's
:.,,lzust 1, met the

Ist Tennessee commander

discs the possibility of
nrsee.

t Chattanooga to

joint off,neive into ::1 ;!le 2r.n-

Although no records of the mfaeting exist, there seems

little ioubt that a simple decision was easily reached.

Kirby

Smith was to invest Cumberland Gap either by seige assau
lt
or oy a northerly -ovement against George 71orsan's supply
lines.

If

1.Accessfu1 in this endeavor, ,ragg desired the

two armies to join .a.inst Buell in Middle Tennessee, Nith
the major objective being to liberate Nashville.

With tnat

.40a1 accomplished., the united Confederate forces might
move
into central Kentucky.

In conjunction 1,1th this movement,

':ajor General .terling Price -nd :ajor Leneral Lrl Van Dorn
4ere to combine to occupy the Federal forces in
nessee.

It was hoped that this movement would reduce rein-

forcements to

26.

est Ten-

from th-,it area.27

733-34.

27, Edmund Kirby 3m1th, "Kencucky Campaign Notes," manuscript, Kirby Smith Papers; Grady McWhiney, 3raxton
and
the Confderate Defeat (New York,
'472-73; Grad
"Controversy in Kentucky: .iralton ,3ragg's Capin of 1062,
"
Civil War iils_tery, VI (March 19v0), 10; C11 , 3er.
I, Vol. XVI,
pt. 2, 741.

tele plan seemed viable, but i.roblems soon developed.
bragg had entered Kirby Smith's department and had felt somewhat embarrassed and reluctant to order directly the activities
28
of the Army of East Tennessee,

This, coupled with Kirby

Smith's probable uncooperative attitude, Induced ,sragg to
allow the question of command to pass unanswered.

The prob-

lem of bragg's personal Inability to command the initiative,
in conjunction with Kirby Smith's uncooperative attitude,
effectively condemned the cooperative effort from the onset.
At the Chattanooga meeting, relations were cordial between tne two generals, each referring to the cooperative Intentions of the other.29

Immediately following the meeting,

Kirby Smith's attitude began tc change.

Through a captured

dispatch, he had received information that the Federal forces
at Cumberland Gap were collecting supplies in anticipation
of an assault from the large Confederate force concentrating
In East Tennessee.

On August 9, Kirby Smith suggested to

Bragg that if "a speedy reduction of the Gap LTia.27 an impractical thing . . . a move direct to Lexington, Ky., would
effectually invest Morgan, and would be attended with other

28. bragg wrote Kirby smith on August 8, 1882: "I find
myself within the limits of your department . . . and should
feel much embarrassed in my present position . . . ."
oer. I, Vol. XVI, Pt. 2, 745-46.
29. Ibid., 741. Bragg wrote Inspector General samuel
Cooper on August 1, 1662: ". . . we have arranged measures for
mutual support and effective co-operation." To his wife, Kirby
smith referred to Bragg as "a grim old fellow, but a true soldier." Kirby
mith to wife, August 1, 1862, Kirby smith Papers.

?4
most brilliant results . . .
In a dispatch tne next day, Bragg was seeminely in agreement as he contemplated moving into either Middle rennessee,
or Kentucky, though he confided that his inclination was "for
tne latter."31

Lzt, that was his only cnoice; he had rt-lnforced

the Army of East '1'ennessee with nearly one third of his effective force, intending co have it returned

when the two armies

combined against be1l, as had been pianned at Chattanoci:.a.
'ow facing buell's 50,000, Bragg commanded a mere 27,000 men.32
Unable to move against buell alone, Bragg had lost the initiative of command; he could only follow Kirby 6mith's lead.
With his direction seemingly marked, Kirby :3m1th initiated
one lust political maneuver to insure his independent movement.

In a letter to Jefferson Davis, he disclosed the revised

Kentucky plan, revealing his intentions to move on Lexington
if Cumberland Gap was too well supplied to allow for an effective investment.

He labeled the plan a "true policy,"

stating that now "Is the time to strike at Kentucky."

JO.

OR., -,er. 1, Vol. AVI, pt. 2, 746.

31.

Ibid., 748-49.

helay-

32. Ibid., 764, 24o; McWniney, iimg4z, 278. The abstract
for the Army of the Ohio for August 1, 1862, lists present for
Juty at 63,81.5. i..xcluding George Morgan's force of 9,000 to
10,000 men and various other brigades not concentrated at huntsville, the estimated total was nearly 50,000. Bragg's forces are
listed witn an effective total of 27,320 at Chattanooga on August 27, 1862. Kirby :_smith's forces numbered 9,707 during
April of 1862. OR., ,)er. I, Vol. AVI, pt. 2, 476. Although
no official reports are given, Heth's and McCown's divisions,
togetaer with various other reinforcements, probably totaled
nearly 10,000, giving Kirby 6mith a command approaching 20,000.

7)(

ing Bragg's capitulation, he stated that the advance would
be "made in hopes of permanently occupying Kentucky.")) Of
all the information conveyed in this lengthy dispatch, Kirby
Omith seemed to have intentionally neglected to inform tne
President that Bragg was facing overwhelming odds and that
a captured dispatch had confirmed that the Federals at Cumberland Gap had obtained subsistence for nearly thirty days.Greatly desiring the liberation of Kentucky, Davis silently
ac4uiesced, allowing Kirby _mith to initiate his personal campaign at his own discretion.

With his attention turned to the

eastern theater, where Lee's army was preparing to Inva,.:e
Maryland, Davis would later admit his ignorance of the situation in Kentucky:

"The expectation that the Kentuckians would

rise en masse . . . alone justified an advance into that State
That expectation has been sadly disappointing."35
Because of Kirby Smith's determination to advance into
Kentucky, Bragg was compelled to revise his original plan.
Instead of moving against Buell in Middle Tennessee as planned, Bragg was forced to enter Kentucky In support of Kirby
Although large enough to expel George Morgan from
Cumberland sap, the Army of East Tennessee was too small to
conduct a lone invasion of Kentucky.

6hou1d Buell advance

swiftly northward ahead of Bragg, Kirby .Dmith's forces might

33.

oh..

34.

Connelly, .Army of the Heartland, '10.

35.

howland, ed., Davis, V, 356.

oer. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 2,

754-53.
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;.,e trapped between

uell's

Unable to defeat

11 ilon,

t -1#

state's home guArds.

1-Lt.4g's only choice uas to ad-

vance into lentucky .,nd attempt to coorlinate u junction of
the tuo Confed - 7..te armies.

A.th only a sugc„estion that Kirby

2mith not advance too deeply into lintucky until the Arz:y of
the M17::issipli could begin its na,.-7.her1y movement, 3rg
again allowed iirby F,711t

t, _

The revised plan , -,;uld

eo=and
xce

uell to retreat In prr,tee-

tion of his supply lines, -3-7,1 on the c. ,do
combined Confederate armies -ould defeat Buell, the
advancing Feder-ti forces ir the rississippi Vtlle
be forced to retreat to protect the

:ould also

th from invasion.

successful, the :outh would be free of Federal troops.

If
To

enhance the revised plan, Price und Van Dorn were to advance
into Middle Tennessee ard defeat V-.:e 7ederul forces there.
3rigudier General Hunphrey Narshull was ordered to enter Kentucky from vestern Virginia in suppo:L-t of Kirby 3flith, und a
7.;ixth clement under the command of Major General John C.
.„reckinrIdge, thn serving under Van Dorn in nssissippi, was
to join

r's forces in Kentucky.

The

:spelL

of tkle coopera-

tive effort was to be a lurge Confe - erate force united on thc
,nio Liver an,
, Kentucky freed of Union contro1.37
Although the revised plan :- ecmed to iromise .,reat results,

3er. I. vol.

VI, pt.

2, 746-49.

37. Ibid., 740-49; Kirby Limith, "Kentucky Campaign Notes,"
Kirby Smith Pipers; Archer Jones, Confderate .trateLy from
-11oh to Vicksburet (baton ilouge, 1961), 74-7.--).

a major problem soon developed.

Cooperation of the sixsep-

arate armies proved impossible.

As pride and peraonal ambi-

tion became factors, and as Bragg refused to command the situation, none of the cooperative elements completed its assit,nment.38

Not until the main Confederate force was in retreat

was a successful junction between any of the participating
forces completed.

Hampered by Bragg's inability to take the

reins of command, the campaign was doomed to end In failure.
Possessing the command initiative and the President's
approval, Kirby Smith began to prepare for his campaign into
Kentu%ky, citing the 7
1 deral stronghold at Cumberland Gap
as his first objective.

His interest in seizing Cumberland

Gap may have been overemphasized by some historians.39

Al-

though seemingly humiliated by being forced to surrender a
portion of his department, the proposed maneuver against
Cumberland Gap may also be viewed as a means for Kirby 6mith
to enter Kentucky.

To illustrate this, as the Army of East

Tennessee advanced toward Lexington, Kirby Anith ordered the
area north of Cumberland Gap abandoned, allowing Morgan's
forces to forage In that region.4u

If the major oojective

of the campaign was to invest Morgan by cutting his lines of

38.

Jones, Confederate Strateu,

108,

39. Parks, Kirt!y 6mIth, 202, 204. The movement against
Cumberland Gap is represented here as Kirby .litith's primary
objective, and the movement toward Lexington as contingent upon
Morgan's evacuation.
40.

,Jer. 1, Vol. Vo0I, pt. 2, d14.

supply, and, in doing so, cause him to evacuate the Gap due
to lack of provisions, Kirby Smith would not have allowed the
Federals to accumulate supplies from any of the surrounding
areas.

Yet, from another point of view, George Morgan may

have been allowed to collect provisions to delay his evacuation, riving Kirby Smith the necessary time to carry on his
planned activities in the Bluegrass.

For whatever the reason,

it is evident that Cumberland Gap was employed only as a means
to invade Kentucky.
Because of the slow movement of his supply trains from
Corinth, Bragg felt that he was unnecessarily delaying Kirby
Smith's advance into Kentucky.

Fearing that Buell might move

northward by rail into Kirby Smith's front, Bragg conveyed to
the East Tennessee commander, on August 12, that he no longer
wished to hinder the initial thrust of the campaign.41
Having been preparing his forces for the movement since
late July, Kirby Smith was able to complete preparations within
just a few days, and in the early hours of August 14, his
army left Knoxville as the Kentucky invasion began.42

Cov-

ered by the cavalry forces under Colonels J.J. Morrison and
John S. Scott, Kirby Smith advanced northward at the head

41.

Ibid., "54-55.

42. Ibid., '40. George Morgan reported to Buell cn
July 31 that a Federal spy had encountered "a formidable
expedition . . . organizing Jr. Knoxville7 to gain my rear
". Kirby Smith to wife, August 7, 1862, Kirby Smith
Papers; Parks, Kirby Smith, 204.

29
of t',.o -71visions conled by
And :.j. Church111.43

r1L

ier,;c!:crals

. Clcburne

At a strength of 6,0"J), t::is force

pased through - ogers

ç,

heth led irigadier General

Davis' and Leadbetter's Oriz;ades throuEh Ji

Cree% jap.
-

At

the hel“1 of 9,000 infantry, Carter 3tevenon advanced with a
third column to the Federal front at Cumberland Gap.44

Fol-

iowink, a. victory over a smal Federal force at London, Kentucky,
7,cctt's cavalry entered

L-Arbourville from the north on August

lb., only hours ahead of Cleburne's And Churchill's iJ.Ivisions.
:.Arrived two d,Ays later,

:let:'6 division Entered

the small Kentucky town on the twentictil.
To guard against a swift -lovem-nt by all or kart of
force to 'Kirby .rilith's front, John Hunt !..organ was sent to
disable the Louisvill
tion of this task,

.rid

i.allroad.

Upon comple-

,zr!'s force was to meet the Army of

st

Tennessee in Lexington, whf‘re Kirby 1:,m'th planned to renrie7vous by early Seitef:Orr.46
Thus free fro.a try counter movement from .,)uell's force,
Kirby ::mith could rst
until

ra

e.xhauted forces at 3ar'3ourvil1e

either defeated or outal-,rched

u.11.

rhe advAnce

43. Kirby ::.>mith, "_eLtucky Campalex kotes," Kirby
erb. McCown was left wit'a u s.4_1!Aon force to administer
affairs at Knoxville, but later joined tn.,
in force at Lexington. Connelly, Army of the H.:.artlJnd, 213.

44. Kirby Mith, "Kentucky Campaign Notes," Kirby
rapers; Q,Ser. I, Vol. XVI, pt.
755.

rnith

r. Kirby Smith, ''Kentucky C-mpaign Lot:es," Kirby _
. mith
Papers; larks, Kirby ,mith, 20E.

";6.
136-:.1%

OE ,

I, Vol. XvI, pt. 1. 878-79;

Holland, Moplun.

from Knoxville was highly successful, but the rugged mountains
took their toll.
flcult.

The road vwr rough, hici the oarching was dif-

The men were ragged ane footsore from haiding artil-

lery over the rigorous terrain, althougn, as their commandt,r
later wrote, they successfully completed their task "without
a mnrmur."

Upon his arrival In Kentucky, Kirby -;mith desr;ribed

we-ry force as a "rough wild: rap:ged looking assemblage
. ::ubordinate, cheerful and uncomplaining, with a strong
religious element . . . ."47

Certainly, relion played a

major role in preserving the morale of the forces of the army
of East Tennessee.

One author describes the march troy! Kncx-

ville as "almost a muss prayer meeting...4o
Triumphant in his rigorous march through the mountains,
Kirby Jmith became somewhat overly enthusiastic.

he described

the advance as a "herculean undi!;taking" and "Li task rivaling
the passage of the Alps."

heferring to the boldness of his

move as similar to the accomplishments of Cortez, he wrote
to his wife:

"I :.ave burnt my ships behind me and thrown my-

self boldly into the enemy's country.

The results may be bril-

liant and if successful will be considered a stroke of Inspiration and genius .

."

He Also found parallels in the accom-

plishments of Moses with the Army of East Tennessee, "like the

47. Paul F. hampond, "Campaign of L,eneral E. Kirby Dmith
in Kentucky, In 1do2," Southern histlrical .ociety Papers, IX
(10b1), No. 2, 247. Published In five seperate sections. hereafter cited by section number. Kirby ,)mith to wife, August 20,
21, 1662. Kirby -,mith Papers.
46.

Connelly, Army of the heartland, 212.
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gyptians of old," 6od had 'hardened ghe enemy's/ hearts &
blinded their eyes to make their destruction more complete."
Obviously overstating his achievement, Kirby smith found it
necessary to defend his actions.

"I care not what the world

may say, I am not ambitious . . . I shall consciously do my
duty."49
Under the pretext of duty, Kirby :;mith had, through
various political maneuvexs, achieved his 6oal of invading
Kentucky.

Eising his actions upon John Hunt Morgan's successes

and misinterpretations of the state's political feelings, the
East Tennessee commander had abandoned bragg and the Army of
the Mississippi in the face of overwhelming forces.

Hav1n6

allowed Kirby z,mitn to seize the initiutive, isragg, unsure
of what actIon to take, meekly followed.
Although Kirby .121th's revised plan had some strategic
merit, it was sparked by personal ambition and lacked sufficient planning and cooperation from the various forces involved.

As the campaign continued, the problems of command,

cooper tion and desire for personal achievement would intensify, thus lessening the possibilities of success.

49. Kirby tilith to wire, August 21, 23, 24, 25, 1862,
rArby ..)mith Papers.

CHAPTER THREE

FROM BARbOURVILLE 10 LEXINGTON
As Kirby Smith triumphantly entered barbourville on August
lb, the second segment of his pre-devised plan began to unfold.

He had willfully placed himself in a precarious posi-

tion.

The country surrounding barbourville lacked suffici-

cient provisions to sustain his troops longer than George
Morgan could maintain his own army at Cumberland Gap.

with

the area infested by surprisingly active bushwhackers, Kirby
-mith had seemingly worsened his own position rather than
having successfully turned the Cumberland Gap stronghold.
Even Morgan recognized Kirby Smitn's predicament, as tie reported the situation to buell:
three weeks in my rear.
my present command."

"mith cannot possibly remain

I can hold this place five weeks with
If Morgan was aware of the destitute

character of southeastern Kentucky, Kirby .mith also must
have had knowledge of that fact.

It soon became evident that

Kirby smith was more than aware of the inability of tne area
to support his army.
Two days following his arrival In barpourville, Kirby
smith reported to sragg his seemingly serious problem as his
intentions began to develop.

In a tone that suggested no

previous Knowledge of the situation, Kirby -Amith informed
bragg of the stripped comiltion of the region and summed up

1.Ofier. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 2, 352.

12

his situation by offering two solutions to the
problem.
have but two courses left me--either to fall
back for supplies to East Tennessee or to advance toward
Lexington for
them."

He continued

with the oovious solution:

"i'he former

course will be too disastrous to our cause in Kentu
cky for
me to tnink of doing so for a moment.

I have therefore de-

cided to advance as soon as possible upon Lexin
gton."

The

next day, Kirby .Attith informed Davis of his inten
tions In the
same manner, designating his choice to advan
ce toward Lexington
as "unquestionably the lesser of two evils
.

."

He again

portrayed his disregard for Bragg's overwhelmi
ng problems by
asking for reinforcements and stating that he
had "nothing
to fear from ouell."3

Ly the same type of political and mil-

itary maneuvering that he had employed to advan
ce into Kentucky in mid -August, Kirby Smith, in the latte
r part of the
month, began to disclose developments In his prede
termined
design for an independent movement into the
heartland of
Kentucky.

Against oragg's expressed orders of August 10,

Kirby Smith began his advance toward Lexinc:ton
before the
Army of the Mississippi could begin moving northward
from
Chattanooga.
While in occupation of oarbourville, Kirby .mith
was
not entirely certain that bragg had made a final
decision
concerning his intended destination from Chattanoog
a.

2.

Ibid., 7b6-b7.
Ibid., 7b6-69.

Kirby

34

.I;h serm- 4, to

lritl

4 ;''!
.‘

A

;-() force -r:it
; into -akinz

f-ciFlon.

C or t,t

:2oved into:
,ntucky iTmediately folloir_

*-11.th's

rt-Lue from .-.;arbourville, the strtegy seemed to hb.ve been
effective, but that may not h:tve been thr case.

13r,I.g's de-

cision to enter Ke:ntucky came as early as August 8, when he
confided his Ilan to

. Stolflard Johnston, a prominent Ken-

tuckian ,.nd 1.ter edi;or of the K€ntucky YeoTan.

Yrior to

that date, 6ragg inter.(2 e?! tc avvnce against

in '
,
!i(!dle

Tennessee, as he had pledged to 'sham Harris in Lite ‘;'.11y.5
but -s

bmith br an forcing alterations in the ,roposed

.idle Tennessee plan, bra, by Augunt 8, was compelled to
capitulate to the your.Ler, rlore aggressive commander.
Althow,h, accolo]ing to Johnston, 3ra.g had decided thAt
Kentucky rather than Mi'lle Tenntsr.ee

as to be the objective,

he seemed skeptical in his correspondence to Kirby Smith.
Cn August 10, jrLtg appeared more 1;.clined to an 11.,
:71.cr. of
Kentucky, but tl,o days later, he referred to his Intentions
to "push on 71 ('le Tennessee," exclulin; any reference to
Fcrtucky,

In a ''ispatch of Au ust 15,

desi/e to enga

portryed

--;e1.1 before entering Kentucky.?

It is con-

4. J. btoard Johnston, "rira66's C-.4-ign in Kentucky,"
manuscr1.ct. J. StodcLtrd Johnston Papers (ranusc -1-1,t Division.
2he Filson Club Historical bociety, LouisvIlle, KrLtucky).
_;•

Ser. I, Vol. XVI. pt. 2, 710-11, 7)9-4o.
Ibi71., 748-49, 754-55.

7.

• 756-59.

ceivable that Bragg was not indecisive at this point in the
campaign as Is often thought, but was considering Kirby Smith's
intentions for an ambitious advance on Lexirw- ton.

Bragg may

have felt that a show of Indecision mignt have kept Kirby
smith in check until the Army of the Mississippi could have
been positioned to protect against a swift Federal movement to
Kirby Smith's rear.6

To add substance to this theory, it is

highly unlikely that Bragg would have considered the possibility of advancing into Middle Tennessee while a substantial
portion of his army was being included in a planned invasion of
Kentucky under an uncooperative commander.

Although Bragg

mistakenly imagined that the Federal army was severely demoralized, he was aware that bell was fortifying Nashville in anticipation of a full-scale Confederate attack.9

Exclusive of

Federal numerical superiority, a , Irect attack upon a well
provisioned stronghold would not only have been frivolous, but
disastrous.

by August 8, with no cnolce but to ac4ulesce to

Kirby smith's plan, bragw made the decision to forgo the Middle Tennessee invasion and, in confidence to stoddard Johnston,
join in the invasion of Kentucky.
toddard Johnston's influence In the 1b62 Kentucky campaign went beyond his being informed of bragg's strategic decision to invade Kentucky.

hn route to 6reensburg, Louisiana to

6. by placing his army between buell and Kirby smith,
L,ragg thwarted Buell's original plan to move against Kirby
smith's lorce in the bluegrass. See ibid., 40.
9.

Ibid., 78c.-83;

Chumney, "suell," 119.

selve under the command of John C. L,reckinridge, Jonnston
deferred his journey at bragg's headquarters in Chattanooga
to lobby for a Kentucky invasion.

Traveling along a line

from Harrodsburg to Liberty, to Albany, Kentucky, and on to
Sparta, Tennessee, to Cnattanooga, Johnston entered :Jragg's
camp on August 7.

With the decision to enter Kentucky In

its final stages, bragg was contemplating a possible route
of invasion.

Johnston's route from the bluegrass most ap-

pealed to him.

baell's forces were positioned along an arc

from Stevenson, Alabama, to McMinnville, fennessee.

ny mov-

ing his entire force from Chattanooga, across tne Tennessee
hiver and up the 3e4uatchle Valley to Sparta, Bragg could
outflank buell's force before the Fecerals could concentrate
at Mcv.innville.

In this manner, Bragg planned to position

his army between nuell and Kirby Smith.

After serious delay--

due to the late arrival of the supply trains from Corintn-tne Arr,y of the Mississippi, successfully initiating the flanking strategy, departed Its Chattanooga camp on August 28.11
In a desperate attempt to counter bragg's movement, buell
made a furious attempt to concentrate at McMinnville.

nut

confused as to bragg's Intentions, he withdrew behind the
fortifications at Nashville)"

10. J. Stoddard Johnston Clary, August 14, 1862, J.
btoddard Johnston Papers.
11.

Parks, Kirby ,Jmith, 223; Chumney, "„)uell," 121.

12. OR., ber. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 1, 712-13;
Cnumney, "buell," 119-23.

pt. 2, )04;

3?
As the Confederate army advanced toward Kentucky, Bragg
soon learned that Stoddard Johnston's proposed route to the
rluegrass was insufficient to sup , ort his advancing army.
To contemplate an alternate route, he interrupted his army's
sldvance at Sparta, on September 3.13

Here, bragL decided to

move his force toward Glasgow, Kentucky, an ,./.ea represented
to rum as ..,uficiently rroductive to support his troops.14
At Glasgow, Bragg hoped to intersect the Bardstown Pike that
would lead him directly to the Bluegrass s,nd the planned
merger 7dth the elusive Army of East Tennessee.15
On September

7, Forrest reported tht a large Federal

force was rapidly withdrawing from Nashville.

As the only

k deral depot betwen Nashville and Louisville, 2owling Green
would undoubtedly De Buell's immediate objective.lc

Perceiving

13. Johnston, "Bragg's Campaign," J. sstoddard Johnston
'rapers; Connelly, Arms of the Heartland, 224. Until recently,
it was thought that Bragg delayed at Sparta to consider the
possibility of attacking Nashville rather than enter Kentucky.
see Parks, Kirby Smith, 223-24 and Horn, Army of Tennessee,
1C7. The only decision made at Sparta concerned the route to
be taken into Kentucky. Bragg had decided at Chattanooga, on
August 6, against attacking Buell. iAa Loute to sparta, Bragg
received information that uell was evacuting northern Alabama !nnd concentrating at Murfreesboro. OR , Ser. I, Vol.
XVI, pt. 2, 798. Also, fortification of 1,ashville was continuing. Connelly, Army of the Heartland, 225. Bragg had
ordered Price to advance on Nashville a ,uickly as possible,
assuming that Buell 'e'ould
.thdraw into Kentucky in pursuit
of the Confederate advance. OF., Ser. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 2,
798; Connelly, Army of the Hestrtlnd, 25.
14.
Papers.

Johnston, "Brag's Campaign," J. ,
.toddard
Johnston

15.

Connlly, Ar-ls of the heartlnd, 425.

16.

Lit.,

er. I, Vol. xVI, pt.

799-600.

-19

the Federal destination, pra«,g informed 1.1s field commander,
Major General Leonilas Folk: ". . . we must head him off
from Kirby Smith."17

'with a difference of less than forty-

five miles separating each army from its Kntucky objective,
the race to thf 7,reen Fiver Valley promi

d a close contest.16

Although the Confederate campaign began in a manner that
lAcked coopen,tion '!nd favored evsive tactics, its progression
not only exhibited successes but a possibility of overall
success that could severely retard Federal activity in the
6est.

At this point in the Kentucky campa1;r1 of 1062, the

strategy of the Confederate commanders looked promising;
6rag ivid successfully maneuvered his forces between those
of

uel1

nd Kirby 6mith, and Van Dorn and Frice had Peen

directed to combine in a highly strategic movement into Middle Tennessee.19

Heinforcements under

the command of John

C. Dreckinridge were momentarily expected at .braga's headquarters.20

From the east, riumphrey Marshall was entering

Kentucky in support of the planned Confederate concentration
in the bluetrass; -rd, fins_lly, the initial invasion force
under Kirby ..mith nad advanced victoriously in Its :rive

17. James b. 1-r57, 0p rations of the Army under L)utll from
June 10th to October 30th, 1862, and the
Commission (fNew
York, 1P84), 45.
18.
ier. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 1. 45. thrazE marched
fifty miles from the Cumberlt:nd river to Glasgow. .ouell marched
95 miles from Na6hv1lle.
19.

Ibid., pt. 2, t98, 782-83.

20.

Ibid., 784.

1C)

from barbourville.

Truly, the campaign seemed filled with

promising results.

Marching unopposed, the Army of

ast Tennessee had pushed

northward from its temporary position at barbourville on August 25.

Kirby Smith's advance toward the bluegrass was char-

antristically bold. but his ambitiou

nature seemed to be

dimilning as he reported to ..)ragg tesonsequences that
might lie ahead,

. . . should ghe people of Kentucki7 fall to support me/
. . . my position will be a very precarious one and . . .
very soon I shall have to fall oack; also if I should
meet with a resistance too great to be overcome this side
of the Kentucky 2Kive;17 I shall have to getreat7 under
the circumstances of great difficulty.
This show of reservation was, for the first time, coupled
with a recognized need for support from the Army of the M13slosippli "The country along this route in being very poor
will be exhausted of supplies, so that if i am compelled to
fall back I shall endeavor to maneuver so as to bring myself
Into communication with your fforcei7."21

Kirby 0mith's

reservations were unnecessary; he had little to fear from
the events that were immediately anead.
heinforced by a brigade from his forces in surveillance
of the enemy position at Cumberland ,,ap, Kirby bmith continued
his rapid push into Central Kentucky.2‘

21.

Ibid., 775-76.

22.

Ibid., 778.

On August 23, Colonel

Lt 0

John -cott, commanding tne rirst Louisiana Cavalry in

U0-

vance of tne invading force, succe6sful1y engaged and routed
a small Federal force in occupation of a strong placement
just south of hichmond at big hill.'-

i.ffectively opening

the route to the Dluegrass, the small but significant victory
also reaped various spoils, which included a captured Union
dispatch relaying information of mounting Pederul strength
24
near i..ichmond, Kentucky.
Kirby -mith was encouraged upon learning that the I.ederals were intending to take a stand near hichmond.

He had

feared tnat they might withdraw to the naturally strong bluffs
of the Kentucky River, where a small enemy army might easily
force the advancing Confederates to postpone, or even abandon
their advance.

25

Although relieved of tnat possibility,

Kirby 5m1th had not expected to encounter Union resistance
this soon.

rorcibly rw-rching his army ninety miles in just

three days, the Confederate commander had left Heth far behind

with 4,000 troops to guard the slow moving trains.26
Taking into advisement ,,cott's information that the

Home Guards "could be scattered to the winds by one third

23.
E...dmund Kirby .7;mith, "Kentucky Campaign Notes," Kirby
,Alith Papers.
24.

Oh.,6er. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 1. 80b;

25.

Hammond, "Phe Campaign of Kirby 3mith," No. 2, 250.

pt. 2,

775.

26. James L. Morrison, Jr. "The Memoirs of Henry Heth,"
Civil viar History, VII (Jan. 1962), 21; Thomas D. Clark, A
History of Kentucky (New York, 1937), 457.

41
their numbers if the move is made at once,"27 the Army of
Last Tennessee pushed on through the eastern Kentucky mountains, bypassing Crab Orchard, and successfully initiating
the toilsome ascent of Big Hill.

On August 29,

LIrby ,Anith's

force descended into the brim of the 6luew.rass, a mere ten
mtles from hichmond.

Thqt afternoon, .- cott's cavalry advance

skirmisned heavily with Federal i;ickets along the Richmond
road, and at one point was driven back upon Cleburne's infantry.
" On the night of Aucust 29, Kirby ..-3m1th directed
Cleburne, his most vigorous commander, to lead his division
in advance of the next day's attack.29

That night, Kirby

imith conveyed to nis wife his knowledge and feelings of the
situation before him:

•

. . troops are rapidly collecting

from Indiana, illZThois7--and Chlo, but they are new levies
and we do not fear the result.
Richmond

We shall move tomorrow for

30

Kirby Limithl:D swift advance had caught the Union forces
entirely by surprise.

Major General William Nelson, at his

nead4uarters in Lexington, did not receive word of the approaching Confederate army until August 30 at 230 A.M.

He

4uickly ordered his commander at Richmond, Dri;:adier General

1_7.

Oh., oer. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 1, 607.

26.

i,arks, Kirby _imith, 221.

2.

oh., oer. 1, Vol. iVI, Pt. 1, 944-45.

30.
Papers.

Kirby .mith to wife, August 25, 1o62, Kirby .Dmith

Mahon D. Manson, not to contest the advancing forces, but
to retreat toward Lancaster.31

Expecting to engage

he enemy

the next day, Nelson raced to Lancaster to take command.
Upon reaching the town and not finding his troops there, it
was evident that his orders had not reached Manson in time.
In hopes of locating his army before a battle could commence,
Nelson hastened on to Richrond.32
Manson, in command of less than 7,000 recruits "scarcely
three weeks from the corn fields and thrashing floors of Indiana," has assumed that he had crly two choices at his disposal:

. . whether I should allow the enemy to attack me

in my camp or whether I should advance and meet him."

Not

considering retreat, he chose the latter course.33
The morning of August 30 was represented by an observer
as "warm, clear and beautiful.
the mists of early day.034

No brighter sun ever scattered

Many of the Federal pickets were

not nearly as beholding of the morning's beauty, for when

71. OR., Ser. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 2, 467;
Smith, 212-1:3.
12.

Parks, Kirby

OR., Ser. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 2, 467.

33. Ibid., pt. 1. 911; Nashville Dispatch, September
4, 1862. Manson reported that "the regiments had never had a
batallion drill and knew not what a line of battle was." OR..
Ser. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 1. 914. The Richmond, Virginia Dispatch,
September 11, reported: ". . . the officers Z;ert7 as green as
the men, Lang unable to give intelligent commands." The size
of the Federal force is questionable, probably between six and
seven thousand. Horn. Army of Tennessee, 164; Connelly. Army
of the Heartland, 216; OR., Ser. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 1. 935.
34.

Hammond, "The Campaign of Kirby Smith," No. 2, 250.

41

they awoke, they found themselves within the Confederate
lines and were 4uickly captured.35
When Kirby Smith reacned the battlefield. at 800 A.M.,
a heated artillery duel had commenced, cnecking the i.'ederal
advance.

me Union army, with its artillery in the center,

was formed in line across the i4,1chmond pike.

Cleburne, lo-

cating his forces to the right of the road with his artillery
on the left, had come up to meet the enemy.36

Cleburne

was

ordered to occupy the enemy until Churchill could maneuver
his division to the left of the road.37

Interqe firing was

followed by a Union attempt to turn the Confederate right
flunk.

At the commencement of the attack, Cleburne was

wounded, but sq,
..9 skillfully succeeded by brigadier 3eneral
Preston _mith, who not only thwarted the attack, out drove
the enemy from the field.38
fhe federal forces retreated one mile and reformed on
a high position near hogersville.

Hidden from view, the Union

right surprised Churchill's division and the Confederate line
wavered under the intense firing, but as Kirby Smith reported,
"Churchill's voice rang out . . . steadying his men and order-

35. Ibid., 250;
Kirby smith Papers.
36.
Papers.

Kirby smith, "Kentucky Campaign Notes,"

Kirby smith, "Kentucky Campaign Notes," Kiroy slith

3/.

Ibid.

38.

uh., _,er. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 2, 947.

44
ing the charge the enemy was broken . . • •.3q

Manson re-

ported that his forces were "compelled to fall back and retreat in confusion."4°
At 12:30 P.M., during the engagement, Manson finally
received Nelson's order not to engage the advancing Confederates.41

Less than one hour later, highly disturbed at the

condition of events, Nelson arrived on the battlefield.

He

made an exasperated attempt to rally his retreating forces,
resorting to such awesome tactics as striking several horror-stricken soldiers over the head with his sword.42
Fairly confident of the battle's outcome, Kirby Smith
acted upon advIce from a member of his staff and ordered
Scott's cavalry to the rear of Richmond to intercept an anticipated Federal retreat in that direction."

At 3:30 P.M., to

give Scott sufficient time to maneuver into position, Kirby
Smith ordered a rest for his exhausted forces.44
At cs00 P.M. the Confederates advanced for the third

39.
Papers.

Kirby Smith, "Kentucky Campaign Notes,"

40.

OR., Ser. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 1, 91.

41.

Ibid., 913.

Kirby Smith

42. J.B. McCullan to R.J. White, March 10, 1878, cited
in the Richmord, Kentucky Daily Register, December 1, 1967,
original in possession of James A. Riddle, Richmond, Ky. Nelson
is often credited with using only the flat side of his sword.
See Clark, History of Kentucky, 458.
43. William R. Boggs, Military Reminiscences of General
William R. Boggs, C.S.A. (Durham, 1913).

3a.

44. Nashville Dispatch, September 14, 1862; Kirby Smith,
"Kentucky Campaign Notes ,w Kirby Smith Papers."

45
time, pas:Ang throu.,-.h the les_I, d enemy camp, end found the
opkosihg forces reassembled or

L:ee outskirts of Lichmond.

A succes_ful atteip.t to turn both the i7ederal rLht and left
was followed la a L,ener_41 charge.

urpristn1y, the Confed-

eretes were met with intense

And heavy casu.,-lties,

uut the

eder 1 lines were eventu lly pushed throug h the town,

and, as the
sued."45

.Lisez.tch, reported, "great disorder en-

A feeble attempt was made to rally the terrorized

Union army, 'out the ralization of hcpelessness And a few
cannon vollys sent "the Foor ..iscomfited
.
fugitives rushirn/
pell-mell into 2The hands of .cott's cavalry/.
was frightful.

The havoc

They threw down their erms and surrendered

in crowds,'" with only u few escaping."
Kirby Smith and his invading force could claim an extensive victory, having captured over four tl:ousnd Federal -- )01diers, includin8 both Munson and Nelson.47

Although Nelson

was severely woun7te -1, he was soon able to escape, tak1n6 refuge
in a corn field to avoid recapture.
ported the Confederate loss

rhe casualty lists re-

t less tnan one half that of

45. boggs, Aaitury :.eminiscences, 33; Olt., 3er. I, Vol.
'AVI, pt. 1, 946; 1;ashville Dispatch, September 3, 1862; New
York Tribune, 2eptember 3, 1862, reported: ". • • they were
completely demora1iz." Nashville ,Disi•_,tch, September 4,
1862, reported: ". . . our arrn ws utt, rly defeated . . .
ending in a pAnic and disgraceful flight."
46. Nashville Dispatch,
tember 14, 1862; Kirby 3mith,
"Kentucky CLImpaign Notes, Kirby Smith Papers.
47.

Oh , 3er. I, Vol.

VI, pt. 1. 909. 914.

46
48
the engaged Federal forces.

The victory was certainly

substantial, but of greater importance to the Confederate
commander was the fruit of the victory.

He considered "all

517 Kentucky to the Ohio . . . at our feet."49
seemed to be.

Indeed, it

Despite Federal insistence "that the rebels

have prosecuted their raid upon our territory to the extent
of their ability," Kirby Smith, at the head of his newly
christened Army of Kentucky, marched triumphantly toward
his objective at Lexington.50
After a short rest to issue congratulatory orders, allow
for the burial of the dead ard care for the wounded, Kirby
Smith directed his forces toward Lexington on ,September 1.51
The road to Lexington was short but dangerous, and another
engagement seemed imminent.

It was expected that the Army of

Kentucky would be forced to repel the enemy troops that might
assemble along the strategic bluffs of the Kentucky River.
If the invaders were successful, the hazardous crossing of
the river would leave the Confederate force divided and open
to piecemeal attack.

Should his army advance to the out-

skirts of Lexington, Kirby Smith was unsure of what to expect.

48. Ibid., 901, 936. The Confederate loss in wounded
and killed was 450; Union casualties were 1,05E. Nashville
Dispatch, September 14, 1862.
49.
Papers.

Kirby Smith, "Kentucky Campaign Notes," Kirby Smith

50. Nashville Dispatch, September 3, 1862; Louisville
Journal, September 1, 1862; OR., Ser. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 1, 913.
c1.

Hammond, "The Campaign of Kirby Smith," No. 3, 289.

47

communication

curville,

his rai.id , vhnee from

with JraQghad c) en lost, _trd if John /Lunt ioran had not
been eqccessful in - estrcying the Louisville and Lasville
huilrol4d, _.;11e1.1's entire force may have beea able to

tdvance

front.5

swiftly into Kirby

As the march toward LexinFton beaan, stracgling became
an immcdite problt- m, reducinc the ;;r

's effective strength.

If the Confederates met Ftrcrig resistance, ::Irby ,2, mith would
have only been able to gatner 2,500 men for battle.53

ro

relieve his depleted force, Kirby „Anith rushed orders to Heth
at :ichmond to unlohd thf sup,ly wagons _lid use them to transport both stragglers and m
main advancing body.

Lbers of his own division to the

:;killfully initiating the order, Heth,

by the next morninw., was responsible for reinforcing the main
body by 2,000 trool.
- s.

4.

As the Conf;-dcrates

til.roached the Kentuc:v i--.1ver, a

small enemy force, stayihg just out of rifle range, retreated
before them, combining with a larger force located on the
-c
river bluffs.
)
J The Lichmond Virginia .Distnitch reported that
tn:.t the invading army would "attempt to

It ,
, as

force their Tfrty across the river • •

• in

but the small Eederal

52.

Ibid.,

2)3.

53.

Ibil

21. Parks, Kirby -Izith, 21.8.

54. 3oggs, Aaltary :._;iliniscences, 40; H,ammond, "rhe
CampaiEn of Kirby ..mith."
3, 291.

55.

Hammond, "rhe Campign of Kirby zAllith," No. 3, 290.

14P
force scattered at the approach of the Confederate
army.56
ro demand the surrender of Lexington, Kirby Smith sent
a member of his staff, Colonel Jonathan Pegram, who, to
his
surprise, marched into an undefended town.

Following an

extensive search, the mayor was finally located and
Lexington
was surrendered.

The next day, Septemoer 2

Kirby Smith en-

tered the town in triumph.;?
The Federals had overestimated the size of the Confederate force, and, unable to receive reinforcements
from the
states north of the Ohio, had retreated to fortify
and defend
Cincinnati and Louisville against an expected Hebei.
onslaugnt.
The state government at Frankfort was forced to evacuat
e,
relocating its offices and treasury at Louisv1lle.)9

The

Federal defenders allowed tne bluegrass to fall
into Confederate hands without a major engagement.
on September

3,

Scott entered Frankfort and raised the

flag of the First Louisiana Cavalry over the state's
capitol. cA)
Successful In his raid on the Louisville and Nashvil
le Ilan-

50. hichmond Virginia Dispatch, september 11, 1062;
hammond, "The Campain of Kirby Smith," No. 3,
269.

.57. Parks, Kirby Smith, 216;
Kirby Smith," No. 3, 291.

Hammond, "me Campaign of

58. Connelly, Army of the Heartland, 216-17.
Federal
dispatches during the invasion exaggerated Kirby
smith's forces
at up to b0,000. See Oh., :er. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 2,
460, 48689.
rhe Nashville Dispatch, September 11, 1862,
reported
Kirby omith's forces at 25,000.

59. New Iork Herald, september
Journel, september 4, 1862.
(30.

Parks, Kirby omitn, 217.
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.
rhe conquest of

the Confr:derate capital

dubiouEly i)rocl!-Amed: "ne think we may saf - ly shy that the
day Gf

cntlickyts -leliverance

rom the hateful thrll of the

62
abolition despotism has brichtly dawned.n

havinc coillpleted

his 61, Kirby Smith, to lecentralize Cne need for
and to occul4 land, '"iskersed his

i-my throu6hout the slue-

Exass, and waited for the rendezvous with :ira66.
Meanwhile, to the liouthKeLA, ,raci,E, and .u1l were cont1nuin6 toward their objectives in southern Kentucky.

Cor-

rectly

that Su-11 would pursue him into Kentucky,

brag& directed

rice to advance into Middle rer.a:esz,ee Ltrd

63
capture lifachville.
Kcntucky,

In responsT to the Confederate threAt
9 therefore his supply lines,

1
under pressure from Washin,Lton to "f1/1,
him," left a substurti!l force to kroteet i4ashville

tnd fell

back toward sowlinE ..;reen to intercekt the Confedrhte _civahce.64
On September 5, sra45.:- received Kirby

rrith'E rei_ort of

the victory at _ichrond, accompunied by an .Akkeal for a speedy

61.

Hammond, "The Cain of Kirby Smith," No. ), 293.

62.

EAchmond V1rE.
-Inla ,Elsr;fAch, :,e;tember 6, 1862.

63.
311:-15.

64.
15.

, ser. I, Vol. XVII. pt. 2, 698; Vol. 2.VI, it.

IbiTi., Vol. XVI, pt. 2, 471.

3ee also, Ibid., 314-

51

,:ifouz, in the .Aue,rass.
izin

'feet t'rL.t.

forces, _.,ragg 0! der'

to thr, 4e -nor

hopIrL

./.7,1th's victory voul.

LVs on

Pon to concentrate at Glasgow, "for

the puipose of :;triking a 1.)low

Green."66

•

ini-

tiating this 2.1aneuver, Sragb hoped to cAiture the i,bandl.nce
of 1,edrral suppli
time, deny

tored at bowlin

use of the only Federal store

Nashville _old Louisville.67
tember 14,

Green, A-11, at the same

was forcE -

epot betwcen

Upon !.:rriving At 3Lasow on
to rescind his plan to

the .Eouthr:rn I:ntucky town when he discovered that
advanced - ore quickly than expected.

Finding the urea around

Glasgow less productive than nE:d been represented, bragg
plannEd to continue his L,dvance to t!-1
possile.C 3

as soon

There he could easily replenisn his food supply,

1,1c1 join his outnumbf:red arL:yt.ith the- .:11- 7y of Kentucky.
From tht, point, plans for an attack on Louisville could be

kt. 1, 932.
(6.

;bid., pt. 2, 806. See also, Federal opinion of
destin.,tion and intentions, ibid., pt. 1, 112.

67. It nas often been thought that Bragg planned to send
Polk into action against buell's -rmy at .6cp,1ing Green; see
Connelly. Army of the Heartlnd, 227, and Horn, army of Tennessee, 170. Yet it does not seem likely that 1)ragt would
have desired a battle at 3owling Green. bragg was aware that
he was outnumbered, out-supplied and out-fortified, and it
would have been impracticable to 2,4
-, seige to bowling Green.
Instead, brag& first desired a Junction with Kirby Jmith.
•

68. Stoddard Johnston reported: ". . . instead of findin:
a region cf plenty, he found a country desolated by the occupation of both armies • • • its resources z_uti/ely .ehaustea."
Johnston, "ra's Cmpaign in Kentucky," j. toddard Johnston
Papers. Cnly three counties surrounding Glasgow raised over
one-half million bushels of corn per year; .
. arren, .3impson
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made.
On September 13, Brigadier General James R. Chambers,
varying from his orders to destroy the Louisville and Nashville
Railroad at Cave City, unsuccessfully attacked a strongly
fortified garrison at Munfordville.69

Not eager to sustain

his first defeat, and concerned for his troop's morale, Bragg
decided to postpone the Bardstown rendezvous to turn the re70
pulse at Munfordville into victory.

The jaunt tc Murford-

ville seemed worthwhile; Bragg's army would only be detoured
ten or twelve miles, and another route, although less serviceable than the Bardstown Pike, could be taken to the Bluegrass.
In the face of the larger and more experienced Confederate army, it would seem that the small Federal garrison,
under the command of Colonel John T. Wilder, would have easily
succumbed to the overwhelming Confederate strength.

Yet,

through a series of unusual delays and postponements, Wilder

and Barren. Buell occupied Warren and Simpson while Bragg
occupied only Barren. All three had been desolated by foraging parties from Bowling Green since the beginning of the
war. Connelly, Army of the Heartland, 227; Department of
Interior, Bureau of Census, Ninth Census of the United States:
1870. Wealth and Industry (Washington, 1872), Vol. III, 159,
163. See also, J.K. Jackson to Braxton Bragg, September 21,
1862, Braxton Bragg Papers (William P. Palmer Collection,
Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland).
69. OR., Ser. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 2, 816; Joseph Wheeler,
"Bragg's Invasion of Kentucky," Robert U. Johnson and Clarence
C. Buell, eds., Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Being for
the Most Part Contributed by Union and Confederate Officers,
(4 vols. New York, 1884-28), III, 9; Chumney, "Buell," 15g.
70. Johnston, "Bragg's Campaign," J. Stoddard Johnston
Papers. Bragg was unwilling to "allow the impression of a
disaster to rest on the rinds" of his men. OR., Ser. I, Vol.
XVI, pt. 1, 1090.
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succeeded in letLtininP the Confederte

tdvance

The :: ,
:dfrals finA.ly capitulated on :etnht.r
pressin

-

17,

Js.

tth

h-rd toward Munfordville in ,,nticiiion of

bsittle, 13ragg ordered the eihteenth to be spent in thanksgiving

prayer.71

Bragg

as exuberant over the first victory of his command.

Cverstating his success, he announced on September 17: "My
position must be f,xceedin,-- ly embarrassing to iuell :And his
ar7ly.

still

My junction ;41th Kirby Smith is complete.
it 3owl1ng Green."72

e11

z7117

41th Kirby Smith nearly- one 'un-

dred miles to the northF.ast, 1.6ras first prtention mi-ht
be attributi:.1 to exagLeration, or optinism, but in the second point, 3r.3,v :;as lanrously wrong.

:;uell had long !Anc,,

left _owlinw- Green, -;nd had moved to Cave City, only ten miles
to the south.

Althou;Th not certain c.f _„r_ges exact location,

iJuell was kressing torrd -unfordville intending to engage
the 1nvaders.73
Finally becoming ,ware of the danger

efore him, 3r:1 ,
7

ordered his army to take a strong position south of Green
utilizing the captured Federal foc.
defense 11ne.74

s i-art of the

Unable to ascertain the Federl ioition or

71. ca , "3er. I, Vol. XVI, pt.
john 2.
"6eige of Munfordville," in Samuel Cole
John T.
Commander of the Li?;- htenirBrigade, (loomington, 19:)6), $5-64;

F77117N777r

,

er. I, Vol. X7i, pt. 1, 903,

73.

Ibid., 48.

74.

4hteler, "1],n.tgg's Invasion," 10.
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intent, Bragg drew his forces ;_nto battle line to protect
against an anticipated enery flanking movement.

This maneu-

ver would later be misconstrued, by both soldiers and historians,
as a tactic by Bragg in anticipation of a battle.

To add to

the misinterpretation, Bragg sent Buckner's division toward
the Federal column in what appeared to be an attempt to draw
the enemy into batt].

Kore realistically, it was Bragg's

intention in sending Buckner forward to discover the exact
Federal location, and not to provoke a battle.

Bragg desired

to 'ight Buell, but not before effecting a junction with
Kirby Smit'cl, and, after some hesitation at Munfordville, he
proceeded toward Bardstown on September 20 in pursuit of

75

that goal.

Historians have severely condemned Bragg for not :ighting
at Munfordville, and thus allowing Buell to enter Louisville.
In Stanley F. Horn's Army of Tennessee, Bragg's questioned
competence has received the most negative attention.

Horn

views Bragg's failure to fight at Munfordville as "one of the
great crises of the whole war."

Horn continues his condemna-

tion by designating the event as "probably
moral crisis."?

he war'_§
.
7 greatest

Horn's basis for such accusations is that

Bragg was in a strategically superior position, that there

75. Connelly, Army of the Heartland, 232-33. Although
Buell was not certain of the Confederate location, it was his
intention to attack Bragg. OR., Sen. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 1, 48;
pt. 2, 849. Generally cited, Wheeler's article in Battles and
Leaders has been instrumental in the misinterpretation of the
activities at Munfordville. Wheeler, "Bragg's Invasion," 10.
76.

Horn, Army of Tennessee, 171.

t5

was rot an overwhelming difference between the two forces
involved, that Kirby Smith could have been ordered to reinforce Bragg's position, and that the question of supplies
should not have been a factor.77
In relation to the Confederate army's position, Bragg
stated that he was reduced "to three day's rations, and in
hostile country, utterly destitute of supplies . . . ."78
Had Bragg launched a successful attack, Buell could have
merely retreated behind the well stocked fortifications at
Bowling Green, and, as J. Stoddard Johnston witnessed, the
situation "rendered a siege impracticable."79

It was evident

to Bragg that "a serious engagement gear Munfordvillt7 could
not fail (whatever the result) to materially cripple me."80
Concerning Horn's estimation of troops involved, a slight
discrepancy should be made clear.

Horn cites Bragg's forces

at 30,000, and Buell's at 38,000.

The Confederate army, how-

ever, did not exceed

7,000 in effective strength.81

Buell's

army, after being reinforced by Thomas' two divisions from
Nashville prior to the proposed battle, easily exceeded 40,000

77.

Ibid., 170-71.

78.

CR., Ser. I, Vol. XVI. pt. 1, 1090.

79. Johnston, "Bragg's Campaign in Kentucky," J. Stoddard
Johnston Papers.
80.

OR., Ser. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 1, 1090.

81. The Federals estimated Bragg's force at 30,000;
ibid., 14. McWhiney, Bragg, 292. offers 26,000. Connelly,
Army of the heartland, 227 estimates Bragg's forces at 27.000.
Basil Duke, Reminiscence of Basil Duke (New York, 1911), 310,
Fives 27,320.
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effectives.8-/

Although Horn's statement that "Confederate

armies could rarely fight on a basis of superiority or even
equality in numbers," is not disputed, a discrepancy of over
13,000 men might be considered an overwhelming difference.83
Horn's insistence that Bragg could have ordered Kirby
Smith to concentrate at Munfordville is resounded by Kirby
Smith's biographer Joseph H. Parks.

On this point, Parks

states that "no amount of explaining can remove the guilt
of incompetence."84

As Bragg and Kirby Smith advanced into

Kentucky, there was very little communication between the commanding generals.

In light of the confused system of command,

it would have been militarily improper for Bragg to have ordered Kirby Smith to assemble at Munfordville without knowledge
of the situation in the Bluegrass or the events surrounding
George Morgan's expected withdrawal from Cumberland Gap.85

Also,

in ordering a concentration at Munfordville, it would have
been necessary for Bragg to have counterordered Kirby Smith's
just wishes conveyed in a letter of September 15.

In this cor-

respondence, Kirby Smith expressed his desire not to concentrate below the Bluegrass:

. . removing the large amount of

82. Buell rated his own force at 47.500. Don Carlos
Buell, "East Tennessee and the Campaign of Perryville," Johnston
and Buell, ed., Battles and Leaders, III. 42; McWhiney, Bragg,
219, cites 40,000; Chumney, "Buell," 161, is in agreement.
83.

Horn, Army of Tennessee, 170.

84.

Parks, Kirby Smith, 225, 229.

85. Williams, Lincoln Finds a General, IV, 108. Williams
states that it "surely would have been the height of folly for
Bragg to order Kirby Smith to join him" at Munfordville.

5?
stores . . . accumulated here renders my falling back a 1:easure
to be avoided if possible, as in the event of such a move it
would be necessary to destroy a large portion of them."
Smith continued his point:

. . . by evacuating this

nirty

BeCtion

we would not only lose . . . unlimited supply . . . but racruiting would be stopped . . . ."66
Horn's statement that Bragg "invented the scarcity of
supplies as a cloak for timidity," is most unjustifiablo.'17
The author further states that the area was "a rich country
which had not been subjected to the ravages of the armies of
either side . .

It was not impossible to arrange for sub-

sistence . .

Prior to the war, only two counties of

that area, Barren and Hardin, raised over one half million
bushels of corn per year, hardly a sufficient supply to feed
a large army for any extended period.89

Stoddard .;ohnston,

a member of Bragg's staff, reminisced about the situation.

"rhe

region around ,unfordville is . . . moderately productive.
For a year previous it had been foraged and exhausted of its
surplus, first by the confederates . . . and then by the Fed-

Ser. i, Vol. (Vi, pt. 2,
57. Horn, Armw of Tennessee, 171.
see Parks, Kirby 37,1th, 225.

85.

'or the same opinion,

Horn, Army of :ennessee, 171.

89. Department of Interior, jureau of Census, inth
Census of the United
tatess ila. wealth and saidusT77—TWashington, 1-572), Iii., 1 , 1.3. As a .4unfordville resident and
eyewitness to the incident stated, jragg's "men complained
very much of hunger. ,any of them told me they had not eaten
a mouthful for three days." U.., Ser. To Vol. XVI, pt. 1, 293.

er41s . .

•

“Y0
•

A.so, Horn's cont.Iltion th t
._711th's trains as early as :1;ep.tember

h d
19 Is

ccess to Kirby
. nfounded.

`1,

first „iuntity of 1:rovis1ons to reuch 3rau; from Kirby _ILL
was not ordered to lc,kve Drville until Septe7ber 21. g1
la.ter reported that his rations had dwindled to
three d_y's supply.

Parks contests this z.tatement by

ically askin:, "Did I3raEg epect a battle to last more ttn
three lays!"92

Horn adds that ". • . three lays' r,tions

were enouh to curry the 'rmy throw-,h any ordinary
levina the luestion of further supilies to be consil
after a battle was fout_ht and won, or even lost."93
thl:t ab.ttl

Consia-

ould probably h-sve 1,sted only one d: Y.

but possibly two, it would h'Ive been impossible for Bra4,z to
support his fatiuc-d troo2s for a three or four day march to
the nearest Confederate supply depot at Dunville.
It sPems evident th t Lra.6 , avoided a l
- ajor military
blunder at Munfor,dville, Out further €,1-!lence can be presented.
DesOte the actual size of the opi.osir4,
. forces, 3ra7c.- was in
posses ion of information that estiw,ted the Federal army at

90. J. 2todd.,rd Johnston, "Kentucky," 7,..omas Yoselcff el.,
Confederate Military Hiztory (12 vols., bew Ycrk, 1962; first
17,ub1ished 1899), TX, 113. See also, 3,1ell's opinion that the
area was unproluctivP. OL., .:.›er. I, Vol. XVI, it. 1, 46. See
also, J.-% Jackson to Braxton
tb_r 21,
Palmer
Collection.
91.

.cr. I, Vol.

pt.

92.

Parks, 4
- irby :Alith, 229.

93.

Horn, Army of reIliessee, 171.
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twice his own strength.

Although the blame cannot be laid

upon anyone but Bragg for not insisting upon accurate information, his knowledge of the events before him are what influenced his decision, not tne actual numuers procuced by
hindsight.
The scope of

the entire western tneater must also be

taken into account.

president Davis had instructed Bragg not

to expose his army to the possibility of defeat.

It was quite

apparent to both the general -_And the President that if Bragg's
army was defeated the entire ri ht flank of the Confederate
western front would have been exposec. to Union occupation. "
Had Frice and Van Dorn been overwhelmed by the Federal armies
advancing down the :ississippi Valley--as was the case ut
Corinth less than a month following the Munfordville encounter-there would not have been an active Confederate force in the
entire 'nest to contest the Federal thrust into the deep .outh.
Obviously. brag6 snould not have fought at iiunfordville,
and his reasons for not doing so are more than adequate:

heduced at the end of four days
and in hostile country, utterly
a serious engagement brougnt on
ection could not fail (whatever
ally cripplA tme. Tne loss of a
disastrous."

As .Aoddard Johnston reported, even
sional commanders agreed,

to three day's rations,
destitute of supplies,
anywhere in that dirtne result) to materiuuttle would be eminently

ragg's rebellious divi-

"1 rememuer none who deemed it

94.

Connelly, Army of the Heartland, 233.

95.

On., Ser. I, Vol. XVI. pt. 1. i390.

6o
necessary . . . that rwell should ue attacked."

Conversely,

Bragg's subordinates "believed that Lliuell'u army would be
effectively disposed of withoat a battle."9u
A)ragg's allowance of

uell's uncontested entrance into

Louisville has also received extensive criticism.97

The ar-

uments In favor of this maneuver are parallel to the reasoning behind uragg's decision at Munfordville.

The invading

army lacked provisions; they were severely outnumbered; and
there was nothing to be gained by an engagement.

Combined

with these reasons was the consideration that a large Federal force was rapidly accumulating at Louisville.

If Bragg

had chosen to move on the city, his forces would have been
trapped between

uell's army marching toward his rear and

the force at Louisville.

If uragg's army was not success-

ful In defeating the Louisville force before uuell attacked
from the south, the Confederates would have been easily consumed.

It does not seem likely that 'bragg could have fought

the two forces independently before the planned concentration
with Kirby ,Dmith could have been effected.

put had t',e been

able to do so, his army of 27,000, already exhausted from the
march, would have possibly been compelled to fight two battles
in as many days, defeating a total of nearly 04,000 Federals,

90. Johnston, "oragg's Campaign in Kentucky," J.
Johnston Papers.

toddard

97. Frank E. Vandiver, fheir Tattered nags: ihe .)ic
of the Confederacy (New lark, 1970), 161; Coulter, Civil 'War
and ileadjustment, 100; Horn, Army of the Heartland, 172_

crate :re-2y Jrt.een the two opposin:
some hope amon6 the Federal offIcers
aTi attack.99
Rather than contest Je.ell. Jra6. w‘s leeldelly
to abandon his Jublous offensive stratec,y.

His army dil not

obstruct duel].'S continuance into LoulevilLe; there were
several routes, other than the Louisville like, by which thr.
Fet!erals could have ente7ed the city without serious exposure
to their ri.eht flenk.100

leather
than attempt a piecemeal

attack of the larger Federal 'army, it was iragg's plan to
co7bine forces with both nrby 3mith and liar5hell.

The three

ar7.ies, tot,ether with the recruits that hal eul-,oeely been
enlistret

nd the force that would be aciuired fo11ow1n6 the

le6a112eation of 'a conscript act, would 6.,11:ntly march a;;,ainst
at Louisville In

lizIr.e, numbers.

evidence for thie ,lan of assault that IL
believe that 3raga had. ever ;letnel to

-c stron6 is the
s

ifficult to

701,f

firet ac4uirine; corei 'erab1€.
-

.re

98, "vaheeler, ".3raz's Invasion," 11. isuell's total
force at Louisville is listed here
3eel1
I been
reinforcel by two 4ivis1ons from 311
. nt. Ceumney, "Luell," 115.

99.

Connlly, Arey of the :!ertleAncl, 240.

100. Ibid., 223.
2ee aso, rcA'hiney, "Controversy in
Kentucky," 191 CL., Zer. 1, Vol. XVI, pt. 1. 48. .ell reflected that "I could e-ve ,voided the enemy by ,p,esL1n2, to
either sice of him."

is more than deductive evidence that points to this fact.
At Glasgow, on ,:eptemper 15, Bragg received a report from
his chief engineer concerning the road conditions and water
supplies from Glasgow to Bardstown.1
" From Munfordville,
Bragg sent L'toddard Johnston to Lexington to direct . .lrby
6m1th to assemble his force at Bardstown."
dent that 4;rag
-

It seems evi-

.ntended to initiate tne Bardstown maneuver

at least as early as Munfordville, and probably as early as
Glasgow.

It is certainly not unreasonaole to assume that

Bragg's entire plan may have unfolded much earlier, possibly
at 0parta.
Despite buell's entrance into Louisville, the Confederate plan of invasion was still intact.

Lxcept lor hosecrans

Federal army, tne advancing Eebel threat into Kentucky had
lorded the major northern armies to retreat to protect their
own soil.

It seems that Bragg's often criticized statement,

"that this campaign must be won by ftv?rching, not oy fi-hting,"
held some truth.1
"
During mid-0eptember, Federal forces throughout the
country were being drawn to the defensive.

Lee's similar

101. David 0. Harris to braxton Bragg, 0eptember 15,
1862, David Bullock Harris Papers (Manuscript Division, Duke
University, Durham, N.C.). It was reported that the information was "relative to the pike road from ZGlasgow/ to Louisville via New haven 1 Bardstown."
102. Johnston, "Bragg's Campaign in Kentucky," J. _.,toddard
Johnston Papers.
103. Colonel David Jrquhart, "aragg's Advance and Retreat,"
Johnston ane Buell, eds., Battles and Leaders, III, 000.

6-;
strategy conducted into Maryland caused the Union to fear
for the defense of such cities as Ly_atimore, Philadelphia
and even Washington.

Confederate morale and hope had cer-

tainly soared as Federal advances into the 0outh had not
cnly been nalted but had been reversed.

"Lord, what a

scare they are having in the north!" wrote a southerner on
the occasion of tne events. 104

rhe outcome of the war seemed

to hinge on the success or failure of the two border campaigns.

One astute historian of the 12er1od states that

"McClellan or Buell could lose the War.

Lee or bragg could

wln it." 105

104. John D. Jones, A hebel War Clerk's IJiary, Larl
chenck, ed., (New York, 1958; first published, 1935). .-)eptember 9, 19b2, 97.
105.

Vandiver, rheir fAttered Flags, 100.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE FIGHT FOR KENTUCKY

Upon entering Lexington on September 2, Kirby smith's
victorious army was met with an enthusiastic reception,

out,

as one southern soldier noticed, "the crowds . . . were composed
for the most part of women and children.

rhe men . . . held

aloof . . . gli7 closely in their homes."

'tither Kirby

Smith failed to notice this pronounced absence at the reception, or he was unconcerned by it, for immediately he announced
to McCown at Knoxville:
are needed.

"Kentucky is rising en masse and arms

If the arms were here we could arm 20,000 men

in a few days."2

Evidently, Kirby smith took Into considera-

tion the characteristically slow accumulation and shipment
of arms between departments, and, in announcing his expectations, hoped to counteract an expected delay.

McCown imme-

diately announced the news of Kirby .smith's seemingly massive
acquisition of Kentucky troops and soon southern newspapers
were reporting Kentucky's apparent Insurgence,

but, on sep-

tember lb, just two days following an announcement In the
itichmond Dispatch of Kentucky's aid to southern hopes, Kirby
Smith wired drag, of his disappointment in the Kentucky populace:

"The Kentuckians are slow and backward in rallying

to our standard.

Their hearts are evidently with us, but

1.

Hammond, "fhe Campalt5n of .1.r.by _-Dmith," No. 3, 292.

2.

Oh., ,Der. I, Vol. AI, pt. z, 797.
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their blue grass and fat-grass gattle7 are against us."3
Attempting to explain the unanticipated recruiting problems,
Kirby Smith wrote his wife on September lb: h. . . I see their
magnificent estates their fat cattle

fine stock ,oing7 I

can understand their fears & hesitancy--they have so much to
lose."

This was certainly part of the reason for the lack

of recruits, but the invading commander might also have considered that those who were of strong southern sympathy had
already left the state to join the Confederate cause, and
that those who still held allegiance to neutrality or were
indecisive were keeping distant waiting for a Confederate
victory before volunteering.

Also, the bluegrass was not

nearly as pro-Confederate as

1rby Smith had been led to

believe.

Hoping to draw his home state out of the Union,

John Hunt Morgan had greatly exagKerated Kentucky's recruiting possibilities when he lobbyed for a Kentucky invasion
by announcing to Kirby

with in July that "25,000 or 30,000

men will join you at once."-

soth Kirby smith and .bragg can

be criticized for not being more knowledgeable of the situation in Kentucky.

1.1.t the strength of this criticism lies

in tneir need for Kentucky recruits to successfully execute
the invasion.

The consequences of this error in judgement

3. nichmond Dispatch, september 16, 1662; Oh , oer. 19
VOL XVI, pt. 2, 846.
4.
Papers.

Kirby smith to wife, september lb, ibb2, Kirby smith

5. .
k211.1., .tr. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 2, 733-34.
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were the most severe of the disappointments to face the Confederate commanders.
In an attempt to decentralize the Lexington supply base
and concurrently occupy the surrounding area, Kirby Smith
dispersed his army throughout the Bluegrass.

Leadbetter was

to scatter the small Federal force at Lebanon and return to
occupy the state capital.

Captain Robert McFarland was ordered

toward Somerset and farther south toward Cumberland Gap to
survey George Morgan's activities.

John Scott's excellent

cavalry detachment was sent to watch the activities of Bragg
and Buell.

If it were deemed necessary, Scott was to destroy

the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, but no other orders
were given for further aid to Bragg.

John Hunt Morgan and

Preston Smith were placed under Heth's command for a daring
move toward Cincinnati.6

In an attempt to weaken the Federal

force in Bragg's front at Louisville, Kirby Smith hoped to
divert Federal troops and attention toward Cincinnati.
Following an uncontested march to Newport--just across
the river from Cincirnati--Heth's force of 2,000 encountered
its first resistance.

As Heth reported in his diary. the

Confederates fired a dozen shots, scattering the blueclad
7
defenders back to Cincinnati.

It seemed that Cincinnati,

or at least the Covington -Newport area, was to be a simple
acquisition.

But on September 11, the eve of Heth's initial

6.

Ibid., 796, 799, 805, 807, 812, 813.

7.

Morrison, "Heth," 22.
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attack, Kirby smith rescinded his order to move against the
Federals at Covington, citing the necessity of "avoiding any
reverse . . . at this critical juncture."d

Had he known the

conditions in Cincinnati, Kirby smith would surely have permitted the attack.

The city vets bordering on hysteria.

On

.eptember 3, Major General Lew Wallace, commanding at Cincinnati, declared martial law in the face of "an active, daring and powerful army . • • •"

Places of business were ordered

closed and the citiLens were impressed to begin fortifying the
city.

Everyone was expected to assist In the patriotic work:

"The willing shall be promptly credited," the commander stated,
and "the unwilling promptly visited."

The New York herald

correctly observed that the Repels would not venture to cross
the Ohio in the face of Federal

nboats on the river.

but

the newspaper feared that Cincinnati, composed mostly of
wooden frame structures, could be quickly destroyed by enemy
shells from the river's southern banks; this

waS

a possibility

that Kirby Smith evidently did not consider.
Kirby Smith's ftctivities, once he possessed the prized
bluegrass, snow an evident disregard for the troubled .srawg.
In extensively dispersing his troops, Kirby smith held a
position that would not allow immediate concentrated action
in bragg's behalf.

6.

It was the younger commander's intent

OR., •Der. I, Vol. XVI.

pt.

9. New York Herald, September
Journel, September 13, 1662.

2, d07. d14.

3, 1662;

Louisville

to accumulate provisions, disperse home guards, recruit,
and, in compliance with Jefferson Davis' grand strategy,
occupy larri.

These activities, inclusive of keeping a watch-

ful eye on George Morgan, were what Kirby smith felt to be
of utmost importance.

Once Bragg reached the Bluegrass, an

immediate concentration of all Confederate forces was necessary.

!
,:irby Smith was unable to initiate it.

Further disregard for bragg's position may be seen in
Kirby 3mith's orders to L'oott, which did not allow for any
extensive assistance to Bragg.

Also, the diversion toward

Cincinnati could have extensively aided bragg's advance had
it been carried through.

Major General H.G. Wright, Union

commander of the Department of the Ohio, had seriously considered ordering his Louisville troops to Cincinnati for the
defense of that city.10

had deth been allowed to initiate

his attack on the enemy at Covington, the diversionary tactic
might have been successful.
Kirby ,Jmith's disregard for bragg's situation was evidently caused by his complete confidence in bragg's ability
to capture Louisville and destroy

uell without aid.

Indeed,

Kirby LAulth continually implored 6ragg to turn against the
Federal foe, who 'has always been the great bugbear to these
people."11

Kirby Smith seemed more concerned with engaging

and defeating George Morgan in his anticipated escape than

I, Vol. XVI. pt. 2. 508.

10.

Q, Ser.

11.

Ibid., d06.
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cooperating with Bragg.

Seemingly fearful of a Federal ad-

vance from Cincinnati in cooperation with Morgan's retreat,
Kirby Smith, in a letter to Bragg on September 19, again explained his view of cooperation south of Louisville:

". .

I would respectfully ask your attention to the exposed condition in which I should leave this valuable region, with
a large force at Covington and Morgan approaching from the
Giving priority to the capture of George Morgan, Kirby

gap."

Smith also stated:

"A descent unexpectedly upon Richmond by

the old troops of Morgan would at this time greatly embarrass
me..12
Kirby Smith's evident reluctance to cooperate with Bragg
has received extensive attention from historians of the campaign, yet there is still room for reevaluation.

It is quite

true that Kirby Smith's non-cooperative attitude proved to be
one of several death blows to the campaign, but he is normally
criticized for not cooperating merely to avoid being placed
in a subordinate position under Bragg.13

Kirby Smith's letters,

writings, and actions do not support this opinion.

In his

post-war reminiscence and in letters to both his wife and to
Bragg, Kirby Smith often referred to his desire to cooperate
and even to be a part of Bragg's command.

Or September 20,

Kirby Smith wrote his wife of his intentions to cooperate:

12.

Ibid., 850.

See also, ibid., 861.

13. Cornelly, Army of the Heartland, 193, 206. Williams,
Lincoln Finds a General, IV, 112; Connelly and Jones, Politics
of Command, 107; McWhiney, Bragg, 292.
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“. . . my little command is posted so as to cooperate with
Bragg .

0

•

"

•

He later wrote:

"GenZTral7 Bragg is in com-

mand, and I am no longer at head of affairs, but have only to
obey his orders."14

Following the war, he stated:

O.
•

•

•

all my movements are made under orders from Gen5ra.17 Bragg
and in strict compliance with his irstructions."15

Those

statements can, of course, be interpreted as self-serving;
to place Bragg in command would release Kirby Smith ''rom
blame.

Yet Kirby Smith's "ron-cooperative attitude" can

easily be seen in a different light.
Kirby Smith's objective of occupying the Bluegrass was
complete.

Beyond small scale diversionary movements, his

force was too small to effectively initiate any further
offensive activities.

He realized this and therefore plan-

ned to junction with Bragg.

The reason that the concentration

of the two armies never materialized was not that Kirby Smith
shunned loss of independence, but that he was in error concerning the priorities of the campaign.

Kirby Smith felt

that Bragg was in full command of the situation to the west
and that a junction of the two armies was not necessary to
the defeat of Buell.

Kirby Smith viewed the Bluegrass as the

primary objective of his portion of the campaign.

He praised

this centralized position; from Lexington he cou:i move on

14. Kirby Smith to wife, September 20, 1862, Kirby
Smith Papers.
15.
Papers.

Kirby Smith, "Kentucky Campaign Notes," Kirby Smith

Cincinnati, junction with Marshall, intercept George Morgan,
or combine with bragg as necessity commanded.

Be was ppsi-

tioned to accumulate vast amounts of needed supplies and solicit extremely essential enlistments.

Kirby Smith was never

aware of the high priority that should have been delegated to
the concentration of Confederate forces below Louisville.
When the order finally came for concentration, Kirby z;mith
shunned it, citing the importance of the Bluegrass to the
campaign.16
Although in disagreement with bragg's desire for a concentration near Bardstown, Kirby Smith, following orders, seut
a division under Cleburne in that direction to "receive orders"
and to "effect a junction" with Bragg's army.

Supplies were

also being accumulated at Frankfort for shipment to the rendezvous point at bardstown.17

It seemed that the two forces

. eptember 16, George
were on the eve of concentration when, on .'2
Morgan rallied his hungry and demoralized force for a desperate escape from Cumberland Gap.

Correctly perceiving the

Ohio Elver as Morgan's destination--and unwilling to accept
the humiliation of a successful federal escape--Kirby Smith
withdrew his forces from the proposed junction with Bragg to
Intercept the fleeing Ftlderals.

Concentration would be de-

layed.

16. Oh., Ser. I. Vol. XI, pt. 2, 861.
"Beth," 22.
17.

ph,,

See also, Morrison,

L)er. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 2, 845-46, 861.
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Concentrating his entire army, Kirby :.5mith hoped to meet
Morean's retreating force near Mount L;terling.

In a letter

to Humphrey Marshall asking for assistance in capturing the
fleeing Morgan, Kirby 6m1th again conveyed his disregard for
the junction with bragg and the extent of his confused priorities:

"Cieneral bragg writes me that he is marching upon

Louisville. and tnat he wishes me to co-operate with him in
an attack of that place.

Of course 1: he wishes it I snail

do so, but I have represented to him the exposed condition
In which I

hull have to leave this rich section, with an

enemy toward Cincinnati and another toward the Gap."1t$

With

his entire army concentrated at Mount sterling, Kirby _)mith
had

widened the gap between the two Confederatl forces to

one hundred miles.
George Morgan seemed trapped, but Marshall had been unwilling to cooperate with Kirby :mith.

Marhsall was a prom-

inent Kentuckian and past Know-Nothing Congressman who had
fled his home state under indictment for treason. 19

Vastly

unpopular with the loyal population of Kentucky, the grossly
overweight Marshall was often the target of editorial ridicule.

Upon learning that Marshall was entering Kentucky to

join the invasion, the Louisville Journal began to ',rod:
is said that dumphrey Marshall is coming this way.

"It

If any

uf our friends design drawing a bead upon him, . . . let tnem

18.

Ibid., d46,

19.

Coulter, Civil War and Readjustment, 140-41.

practice beforehand at a barn door.'"
':qrshall, In command of the separate Department of ifiestern Virginia, agreed in early August to become part of the
invasion of Kentucky.

he was to enter Into eastern Kentucky,

and hold his command of 3,000 in readiness to cooperate with
bragg and Kirby smith.

but problems soon developed.

Jr1 Sep-

tember 7, when it was necessary for Marshall to aid Heth in
nis advance toward Newport, Kirby smith ordered Marshall to
tieth's assistance.21

In obvious resentment, Marshall retorted:

My orders "from the beginning were intended by the President
to authorize me to raise a separate army to be commanded by
myself.

I shall cooperate with you very cordially in all my

movements which in my judgement tend to the promotion of the
-ood of our cause . .

•

•

clear, Marshall summarized:

Making sure that his point was
"I will command my own, under my

orders, wnich are independent of those given you."22

Finally,

after mucn coaxing by Kirby smith, bragg and Davis, Marshall
was compelled to capitulate and move, though very slowly, toward Mount sterling.

He Arrived there September 22.23

As Kirby Smith's force arrived at Mount sterling on

20.

Louisville Journel, September d, 1ob2.

21. GE., Ser. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 2, 751, 607.
Vol. X, pt. 2, 330.

see also.

22. Humphrey Marshall to Kirby smith, Kirby smith
Papers (The Filson Club).
23. Oh., ser. I, Vol. ),VI, pt. 2, d38, 645, d51,
659.
o60, 661.
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september 25, little was known of the condition of Morgan's
army, yet an engagement was confidently expected.

Unknown

to tne Confederates, Morgan's army was in no condition to
fight.

Cut off from the North by Kirby .Amith's effective

investment, the Federals at Cumuerland Gap were on the verge
of starvation.

With options to surrender, starve, or evac-

uate, Morgan chose the latter, intending to escape farther to
the east than wirby Smith expected.24
Morgan was thought to be planning his escape through
booneville tow.rd Maysville, passing through Mount Sterling.
Kirby Smith sent John Hunt Morgan's cavalry detachment to
Irvine, near booneville, to begin delaying tactics.'-5

Aware

of the trap that might be before him, George Morgan advanced
along an old Indian trail to Manchester where he encountered
John Hunt Morgan.

The Confederate Morgan was an encumbrance

to the Federal retreat, yet the larger Federal army managed
to escape eastward to West Liberty and successfully cross the
L)hio River at Greenup on October 3.20

Kirby Smith remained

concentrated at Mount Sterling; he was over sixty miles from
the nearest point along Morgan's route cf retreat and corn-

. Ibid., pt. 1, 993. Morgan later reported; "At this
time ZSeptember 1,l/ we had gone six days witnout bread . . .
and no more wheat could be obtained . . . we had only Lhe alternatives of evacuation or surrender."
25.

Ibid., pt. 2, 4346, 649, d51.

26. George W. Morgan, "Cumberland Gap," Johnson and Buell,
eds., battles and Leaders, III, 00-09; On., Ser. I, Vol. XVI,
Pt. 1,-04-95.
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pletely out of touch with Bragg.
If no other criticisms of Kirby smith are made, he is
generally censured for allowing Morgan to escape.

even

Joseph h. Parks, Kirby .3.mith's prestigious yet biased bloggrapher, totally blames the young commander. 7

To his wife,

Kirby smith expressed his feelings on the expected events
surrounding Morgan's retreats

It is "probable that Morgan

will be forced westward through the Mountains to the big
sandy and I shall finish with my command for the country
west of Frankfort wnere after a junction with Bragg we will
be in force to decide the fate of 0
- :entucky. w2d
was correct in his feelings.

Kirby Smith

The capture of Morgan was not

necessary; forcing the Federal army out of the campaign relieved Kirby Smith of the fear of an attack from the south
and allowed for the planned concentration with Bragg.

Kirby

Smith's fault lies in abandoning Bragg to move his entire
army to Morgan's front.

A more feasible plan would have

been to dispatch a small force to cooperate with Marshall
to drive Moran to the east, out of the campaign.
On september lb, while at Munfordville, bragg first
received Kirby smith's disappointing news of Kentucky's failure to rally to the Confederate cause.

With this information,

bragg must have become aware that the campaign was beginning
to deteriorate.

27.

he had based his plan of invasion upon two

Parks, Kirby

mIth, 232.

28. Kirby smith to wife, September 27, lob2., Kirby
Smith Papers.
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controlling factors.

iirst, success depended upon coopera-

tion from the various forces involved.
to rise and defend itself.

Second, Aentucxy nad

Should either of the two con-

tingencies fall short of 3ragg's standards for success, the
campaign could fail.

Fearful that lientuc4y might not reach

enlistment expectations, 3ragg felt that there was a need for
more support fro ni the commanders operating in ,ississippi.
On September 25, he telegraphed Van .jorn strong, precise
instructions:

"Push your columns to our support . . . push

up to the Chic."29
Throughout the :entucky invasion Price and Van Dorn had
been severely negligent in their part of the campaign.

in-

volved over a dispute of authority, the two commanders had
allowed pride to supersede cooperation.

Separated, the two

armies were totally ineffective in the face of 3rant and
Rosecrans; but together, Price felt, the Confederates could
defeat Rosecrans' inferior army at Corinth and march unopposed
into :;ashville.

Van Dorn was not sure that Rosecrans' defeat

was necessary and was content to remain idle and indecisive.33
Finally, on September 9, when Price informed Van Jorn
that he was initiating his plan alone, Van Jorn capitulated.
On September 2:i, the two armies joined and advanced to their
destruction at Corinth.31

29.

:2R., Ser. 1, Vol. XVII, pt. 2, 713.

30. Robert 3. :iartje, Van Dorn, The Life and Times of
a Confederate 3eneral (ashville, 1967), 210-11.
31.
212.

Ser. 1, Vol. xVil, pt. 2, 69o; iartje, Vani)orn,

r-7

Although the elimination of Losecrans' army would have
t,reatly promoted Bragg's advance, a quick capture of Nashvil
le
was of greater importance.

Prior to Buell's entrance into

Louisville, the Federal supply lines extended to Nashvil
le.
Its capture would have severely retarded buell's activities.
The recapture of Nashville and Middle Tennessee would have
cast the Confederacy in a favorable light internationall
y,
leading to possible foreign recognition.

From the standpoint

of troop and civilian morale, the reinstatement of the Tennessee state government could have had an important effect.
t.ashville was a centrally located s)uthern
capital; It was
a point of control of the lower Cumberland and a center for
agricultural trade.

The strategic importance of Corinth as

a rail center should not be underestimated, but its importa
nce
should have been considered secondary to that of Nashvil
le.
The defeat of Van Dorn and Price at Corinth would have no
small effect upon Bragg's decision to leave Kentucky.
As Kirby smith moved out of supporting distance, as
Price and Van Dorn failed in their mission, and as the expected 30,000 Kentucky recruits had barely amounted to a
brigade, the beginnings of failure must have been evident
to Bragg.

Indeed, just after arriving in Bardstown, Bragg

conveyed his pessimism to the Adjutant General at hicnmond
on september 25:

We have so far received no accession to this army. General Smith has secured about a brigade--not half our
losses by casalties of different kinds. Had the forces
in North Mississippi moved as ordered . . . we might
have made some headway. Unless a change occurs soon

Q

we must abandon the garden spot of Kentucky to its cupidity.34

brag's despondency must have reached its limits when,
on October
?,:noxville.

3, he discovered that breckinridge had just reached
having "encountered every difficulty a man could

meet,"- 3

breckinridge had been detained in Mississippi by

Van torn.

heeling the necessity to retain the Kentuckian

for his own campaigns, Van Dorn was finally forced to release
him, but only under direct orders from Richmond.

With only

one-third of his division, "all that General Van Dorn would
let me have," breckinridge traveled by rail to Knoxville, viz
Mobile, Alabama.34

Arriving in Knoxville on October

3,

breckinridge was again delayed by the lack of transportation.
but he was soon able to organize his army, now reinforced to
8,000, and move toward Kentuck.y.35

before he was able to

cross into his nome state, the Kentucky campaign had ended.
Frustrated by tne failure of his subordinate commanders
to cooperate, bragg concentrated his energy toward filling
his empty ranks with Kentuckians in hopes of saving the campaign.

32.
33.

Upon entering Kentucky, both bragg and Kirby omith

Oer. I, Vol. XVI, pt.
Ibid.,

876.

999.

34.
william L. Davis, breckinridgeg otatesman, ooldier,
(baton
Rouge, 1974), 3261 Q,, oer. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 2,
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35. Davis. breckinrldge, 32/-281
997,
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oer. I, Vol. XVI.
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issued proclamations to the people of the state.36

In both

cases the invading commanders asked that the citizens rise
and drive the Feierals from Kentucky soil.

But the citizens

of Kentucky, aF in the past, did not respond.

Following the

campaign, Bragg displayed to his wife his feelings on Kentucky's
failure to support his army:

"Why then

-11ould I stay with

my brave southern men to fight for cowards who skulked about
in the dark to say to us 'we are with you,

'only whip these

fellows out of our country, and let us see you car protect
us, and we will join you.'"37
Mary prospective Kentucky recruits feared that if they
joined or supported the Confederate columns, they might later
be punished by the Federals should the Confederates be unable
to defend the state.

To offer these Union-fearing, southern

sympathizers e strong argument for joining his army, Bragg
hoped to force them into service through conscription.

The

plan, Bragg thought, might be aided by an officially installed
Confederate governor at Frankfort.

Richard Hawes, upon having

been named Lieutenant Governor at the Russellville convention
in 1861, was the successor to the office of Confederate Governor of Kentucky following George W. Johnson's death at
Shiloh.

The inaugural ceremony was merely intended to add

36. OR., Ser. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 2, 822-23. Copy titled,
"Address to the Kentuckians when the Confederate Army Entered
the State," Kirby Smith Papers. Bragg and Kirby Smith were
each armed with a proclamation written by Davis, but neither
commander distributed it widely. Rowland, ed., Jefferson Davis,
V, 338-39. See also, Vandiver, Their Tattered Flags, 1S8-60.
37. Bragg to wife, November 9, 1862, Special Collections
(University of Kentucky. Lexington, Ky.).

a necessary degree of convincing legality to IJrc*g.g's plans
fcr conscription.
Fulling to learn from past experience and assuming tnat
Luell's army was demoralized and cumbersome, Bragg postponed
decisions for the defense of central Kentucky to officiate
personally at the inaugural ceremony.3d

Polk was left in ,
zom-

mand of the main force at bardstown while Bragg leisurely
toured the Bluegrass toward the state capital.

At Frankfort,

Bragg and buckner, in conjunction with Kirby 6m1th (recently
back from Mount

terling), planned a gala inaugural celebration

that was to become one of tne campalF7,n's most embarrassing
events.
In order to receive a possible—yet unexpected—advance
from Louisville, Bragg suggested to Polk that a defensive
arc mlgnt be constructed from "clizabetntown to .Dhelbyville.
If a retreat became necessary, Folk was to fall back upon
Harrodsburg, via Perryville and Mackville. 39

Assuming that

Polk could control tie situation, Bragg began his excursion
to Frankfort upon the assumption that Buell would not venture from his Louisville stronghold for several weeks.
On October 2, Bragg relayed to Polk information that the
Federals were active near .nelbyville.

Bragg assumed that

it was merely a reconnaissance force, "but should it be a

30. Polk had Informed Bragg on :eptember 30 of the "great
demoralization of buell's army, arising from Lincoln's proclamation . . . ."
OR., ter. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 2. 892.

39. ibid., 291-92; pt. 1. 1109; Joseph H. Parks, General
,Le0n1das Polk, the Fighting bishop (Baton rouge, 1902), 462.
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real attack," he wrote, "we have them."

cla the aiternoon

of the same day, Bragg was more positive.

"the enemy is cer-

tainly advancing on Frankfort," he informed Polk.

"rut your

whole available force in motion . . . and strike him in flank
40
and rear."

Before he received bragg's order, lolk reported

that the Federals were advancing toward Bardstown in three
columns.

the Federal right was located near 6hepnardsville,

the left was at raylorsville, and the center was advancing
near Mount Washington.

Polk informed his commander that if

the opportunity presented itself, he would strike, but if
a retreat became necessary, "I will according to your suggestion, fall back on darrodsburg and Danville .

. with

the view of concentrating with girbi7 6mith."41
Following the war, Kirby Smith claimed that he and buckner
attempted to persuade Bragg to abandon the inaugural plans in
favor of an immediate concentration of the divided Confederate
forces.

Bragg was said to 'nave retorted that his force at

thardstown was sufficiently strong to repel any advance upon
that position.

42

If Kirby Smith's recollection can be ac-

cepted, it is evident that Bragg was not at all aware of the
situation facing him.
The Federal advance continued on the Bardstown position.
By October ), 2aylorsville

&nd

nephardsville had fallen to

I, Vol. XVI. pt. 2, 096-97.

40.

Oh.,

41.

Ibid., 09d.

42. Kirby smith to J. stoddard john.;ton, October )1,
1d06, J. Stoddard Johnston Papers.

the oncoming rederals, and the advance from Mount
Washington
had developed to within twelve miles of Bardstown.

On the

afternoon of October 3, Folk received Bragg's order to
move
directly to the right of the oncoming force, striking the
enemy's right near .)helbyville.

Polk called a council of

his corps and divisional commanders to decide what should
be
done in light of the recently received informatioll.

That

afternocn, he ino.r.med Bragg of their unanimous decision.
"The last twenty-four hours have developed a condition
of
things on my frc,:-it and left flank .

. which makes compli-

ance with this order not only eminently inexpedient but
impracticable."

Polk continued, "I shall therefore pursue a

different course, assured that when facts are submitted
to
you you will justify my decision.43
Polk felt that Buell's entire force was converging on
Bardstown and that a m.vement toward Shelbyville or Frankfort would expose his Jett and rear to inescapable attack
.
Polk and his subordinat- commanders elected to follow Bragg's
original order and fall back toward darrodsburg and
Danville.
For defying Bragg's order, Polk has been severely criticized, especially by Bragg's most recent biographer Grady
McWhiney.

It is McWhiney's contention that had Polk followed

orders, he could have effectively initiated the advance
to-

43. Oh
oer. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 2, 900-901. Brigadier
6eneral Patton Anderson--present at the council--later
claimed
that ne was in favor of Bragg's plan; he feared for the
safety
of Kirby Omith's army at Frankfort. Patton Anderson to Bragg,
April 15, 1863, Palmer Collection;
Qä.L' Oer. I, Vol. XVI, pt.
1, 1099-1100.

ward shelbyvIlle by screening his force from a flunk
attack
through skillful use of his cavalry.44

Although McWhiney

completely discards that bragg was Ignorant of the
Federal
force moving on ;.)ardstown, this theory should not be
rejected.
McWhiney's argument that Polk could have completed the
march
to Shelbyville without engaging the Federal left is weak.
Aowever, in stating that Polk's army would nave been
in no
danger of being defeated had an engagement occured, McWhin
ey's
argument merits scrutiny.

In pointing out that the Federal

left--commanded by Major General Alexander McCook—wav
ered
from an attack by the same Confederate force several days
later at Perryville, McWhiney assumes that McCook could not
have obstructed Polk's advance around the Federal left.
bragg's biographer continues his argument by adding that the
dispersed Confederate force would have been in a better
position for support had a battle occured near Taylorsville
,
rather than Danvi11e.45

McWhiney's argument Is not without

value, but other possibilities should also be consid
ered.
The only cavalry forces under Polk's command were led by
Wheeler and Colonel Jonathan A. Wharton.

Although Wheeler

commanded an excellent brigade, Wharton did not, and both
forces were divided and spent in the face of the onrush
ing
Federals.

It Is doubtful that any effective screening could

have occured.

Also, McWhiney does not explore the possibility

44.

McWhiney, bra, 303.

45.

Ibid., 303-061 McWhiney, "Controversy," 2b.
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that the Federal center--commanded by Major General C.C.
Gilbert--could have joined McCook by moving only twelve miles
from Mount Washington.

Colonel Joshua Sill, commanding the

Federal feint near Shelbyville, was less than eighteen miles
from Taylorsville and might have joined forces with McCook.
Other conjectural factors on both sides of the argument might
also be added, such as the time and length of battle, Polk's
ability to move swiftly, and the ability of Gilbert and Sill
to initiate flanking movements.

Kirby Smith's possible entrance

into the projected battle might also be considered.

Had Polk

carried out Bragg's orders, the Confederates might have been
able to establish an advantage over their enemy, but even
McWhiney agrees that retreat toward Danville was the safest
46
course to follow.
Polk may not be easily criticized for disregarding Bragg's
order, but he obviously declined to inform Bragg of his knowledge of the strength or movement of the enemy, and for this
he can be severely criticized.

It was evident to Polk that

Bragg was in the dark concerning the situation, but the only
information that Polk offered was that conditions had changed
on the Bardstown front and that his arny was in an easterly
42
route.

Although Polk was certainly unaware of much of the

Feleral activity, his negligence in relaying any available
information to his commander was inexcusable.

46.

McWhiney, Bragg, 306;

McWhiney, "Controversy," '8.

47. OR., Ser. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 2, 901;
of the Heartland, 248.

Connelly, Army.
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In the evening of October

3, Bragg finally became aware

that the Federal force advancing on Frankfort was a feint,
but he was mistaken when he reported that it had ceased.
Again, the commander exhibited that he was not fully knowledgeable of the situation when he suggested that Folk establish a flank at Taylorsville, a position already occupied by
the Federals.48
Bragv was thoroughly confused.

Cleburre--a capable officer--

warned that the principal Federal advance was moving via Shephardsville toward Frankfort.

William Hardee, under Polk'

command at Harrodsburg, was in agreement.
" In the face of
confusion and necessity for decisive action, Bragg was determined to continue the inaugural festivities.

Confusing his

priorities, the commander announced that he would first inaugurate Hawes, "then I propose to seek out the enemy.H 50
The ceremony proceeded as planned, but as the crowd
roared upon the completion of the new governor's speech, so
did Federal cannon from across the Kentucky River.

Now even

more confused, Bragg assumed that the force before Frankfort
was too strong to be resisted and he quickly departed for
Harrodsburg.

Kirby Smith was ordered to retreat to Versailles

to reauy his forces for a momentary junction with Polk's army.51

48.

OR., Ser. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 2, 903.

49. Ibid., 898;
Collection.
50.

Hardee to Bragg, October 2, 1862, Palmer

OR., Ser. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 2, 905.

51. Kirby SmiLh, "Kentucky Campaign Notes," Kirby Smith
Papers; Hammond, "The Campaign of Kirby Smith," No. 4, 45859; OR., Ser. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 1. 1091.

Although temporarily distracted, Bragg finally began
to see the necessity of a speedy junction with Kirby 6mith
In the face of Buel'% deceptive advance.
current military 3rc)r.,

Exhibiting a re-

Bragg had again underestimated

the ability of his foes
Buell's strateg:p was both t,e;.re
shrewd.
able to supp- -

enLe ing
art

•.10:

.
-Zb

.k1;k

for a sudden and start),Ing ad!
..yi.

and tactically
september 30, he was

are/

three days

an the Bluegrass.

that the Confederate foret. 16.1 1.C1)1 ne_
Buell, at the head of

60,000 ne

on three converging roa-s.

wt

tc
.%rmard Bardstown

In csoimat.

McCook moved via Taylorsville.

Advancil„,

.terel left,
.6:1 Mount

Washington, Gilbert commanded the FedErsi - enter.
led oy Major General T.L. Crittenden, adva, 'ed
Shephardsville road.

Aware

The right,
ong the

The brilliance of Buelt., .).rategy was

in sending Sill and Colonel Ebinezer Dumont towar

?rankfort

to keep Kirby Smith's army from effecting a juncton with
the Confederates at Bardstown.

The feint was surely more

successful than Buell had anticipated.

Not only were the

two forces kept from joining, but the Confederate command
was left in a state of perplexity.52
Following the war, Kirby Smith severely criticized
brag for not anticipating buell'a movements.

But not only

was Kirby Smith equaly . orl''ube.:1, he complicated matters.

52. Chumney, "Buell," 161, 167-681 UR
XVI, pt. 1, 372, 1024, 1028.

I, Vol.

ihrough inadequate surveillance, he received information
that the Federal left was advancing on Frankfort.

heport-

ing this to Dragg, Kirby Smith implied that he might soon
be overwhelmed.

To confuse the situation further, Kirby

Smith sent several other urgent messages to Bragg tnat were
described by a member of Bragg's staff as "announcing the
concentration of enemy forces, evidently with a design on
Frankfort and Lexington and begging for help."53
Acting only on Kirby Smith's urgent reply, Dragg devised
a new plan; he decided to move his army north from harrodsburg to attack the enemy at Frankfort.

To aid Kirby Smith

as quickly as possible, Bragg sent Major General Jones M.
Withers' division from Polk's command to Kirby Smith's support.54
Lacking credible information contrary to Kirby smith's
communications, Dragg again planned to concentrate his forces
before the Federal advance near Frankfort.

Bragg arrived at

Harrodsburg on October 6 and conferred with polk on the situation.

Bragg would not allow his position to be changed,

and the next day he ordered concentration at Versailles, wnere
he expected the battle for Kentucky to take place.

however,

53. Kirby smith, "Kentucky Campaign Notes," Kirby Smith
Papers. Kirby smith reported houseau and McCook before Frankfort as the main Federal advance. Brent Diary, October 5-6,
1662, Palmer Collection. See also, June I. Gow, "The Johnston
and Brent Diaries; A Problem of Authorship," Civil War History,
XII,/ (march, 1968), 46-50.
54. Oh., Ser. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 1, 1092; Bragg to Kirby
smith, October 5, 1862, Palmer Collection.
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before the orders could be distributed, Bragg received word
that 'Hardee was being pressed at Perryville.

Bragg immediatly

ordered the Confederate forces in that area to converge on
the Fecierals.

Having routed them, Polk was to move to Kirby

Omith's aid at Versailles.55

oragg was still confused.

To add to the cluandry, Ocott reported that the main
Federal force was en route to Frankfort.
felt that his plan was sound;

3ragg certainly

eliminate the annoying force

before Perryville and turn his combined force toward the
Federal army near Frankfort.

From the information that

Bragg had received, destruction of the divided Federal army
seemed certain.
Un October 7, Bragg received a less than urgent messaeze
from Hardee stating that the enemy was pressing him hard and
that a concentration on the Perryville front would be advised.

Battle could be expected the next day, but all other

information indicated tnat the major advance was still toward
the Frankfort-Versailles front.5Q
otill confused on the evening of

c--tober 7, Bragg ordered

Folk to dispose of the force before Perryville, "then move
to our support at Versailles."57

Ehut night, in reply to

Bragg's order to dispatch Wither's division to Kirby

rnith's

aid, hardee briefly impressed upon Bragg his knowledge of

55.

Oh., oer. I, Vol. Ali', pt. 1, 1091-92;

3b.

Ibid., pt. 1, 1092, 1120.

57.

Iola., 1096.

924.

pt. 2, 919-

military science:

"Do not scatter your forces.

There is

one rule in our profession which should never be forgotton;
it is to throw the masses of your troops on the fractions
of the enemy.

The movement last proposed will divide your

urmy and each may be defeated, whereas by keeping them united
success is certain."

Hardee continued his lecture on tactics.

"If It be your policy to strike the enemy at Versailles, take
your whole force with you and make the blow effective; if,
on the contrary, you should teci,:!e to strike in front of me,
first let that be done with a force which will make success
certain."58
As a student, author, and teacher of military tactics,
Hardee was certainly qualified to offer suggestions to Bragg
on the topic, but the information was condescendingly elementary and certainly embarrassing to Bragg.

The real fault

with Hardee's letter--as with Polk's--was its lack of information.

Hardee offered no account of his situation, or of

the size of the Federal force before him.

6till in the dark,

bragg did not employ Hardee's advice, as Withers pushed on
to Versailles.
Both Polk and Hardee were also confused as to the situation.

The often made contention that the two subordinate

commanders were engaged In a type of malicious conspiracy
against Bragg seems improbable.

Although both later orga-

nized against their commander, neither Polk nor Hardee re-

58.

jbid,, 1099.
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quested reinforcements or relayed any information concerning
the size of the Federal force on the Perryville front.

From

the Confederate cavalry, information was sparse and sketchy,
offering no perception of the Federal intent.

The plans for

the next day's battle were constructed against an unseen, uncalculated enemy by three nearly sightless Confederate commanders.59
Bragg had previously planned to direct the activities
on the Frankfort-Versailles front, but, feeling that his
presence might be needed at Perryville, he rode there on the
morning of October 8.

Upon arriving, he received information

that Wheeler's cavalry had fought desperatly late the night
before for an essential waterhole on Doctor's Creek, and that
the cavalry commander had represented the enemy force as
larger than expected.

Despite that information, Bragg was

determined to carry out his plans.

Angry that Polk had not

commenced with the ordered battle, Bragg made some troop adjustments and, in the early afternoon, ordered his gray col60
umns forward.
Cheatham was to lead the attack of the Confederate right
into the Union left, located, Bragg thought, to the north
of the Mackville road.

This attack was to be followed by

Hardee's corps, led by Cleburne's brigade, into the Federal
center, which Bragg assumed was located between the Mackville

59.

McWhiney, "Controversy,"

0.

OR., Ser. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 1, 1092-93, 896-9?;
Wheeler, "Bragg's Invasion," 15.
60.
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road and Doctor's Creek.

The Confederate left, commanded by

brigadier General Patton Anderson, was merely to occupy those
Federal forces south of Doctor's Creek--presumably the Federal right--until the enemy's left could be crushed."

What

Dragg did not realize was that the Federal right, an entire
corps under Crittenden, had not yet reached the battlefield.
Attacking the Federal left and center under the erroneous
assumption that Duell's entire army was before him, Drag's
army would have been subjected to a crushing flank attack
from the Federal right except that the Union commanders were
even more confused than were the Confederates.62
After some disturbing delays, the two forces implemented
their planned strategies.

Cheatham's corps at first faltered,

but scrambled viciously and pushed
two miles.

the Union left back nerly

Aiming at the Federal position to the left of

Mackville road, Cleburne's ferocious attack shattered the
Union position, driving them back several miles.

In the

late evening, Drigadier General St. John Liddell's brigade
was released into the last remnants of the Federal center.

61. Johnston, "Dragg's Campaign," Johnston Fapers;
Mcwniney, Drati6, 216; Oh., er. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 1, 1025.
62. Connelly, Army of the neartland, 260; McwnineY.
"Controversy," 34. In his official report, Crittenden, in
command of the Federal right, stated that he "reached Perryville . . . about 10 or 11 o'clock" A.M. on October 6. Oh.,
,Jer. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 1, 527. Hardee, in his report of
Lecemper 1, 1o62, gives no indication that he was aware of
the Federal corps on the right. Ibid., 1120-21. Folk later
stated that there was "good reason to believe" that Crittenden
was in the vicinity, but an extensive distance from the battlefield. Ibid., 1110.

THE BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE
OCTOBER 8, 1862

Ihe result

1196

a disintegration of the enemy position.bi

The Federal left, commanded by McCook, was so roughly
handled, that Buell later discribed it as "very much crippled"; a portion of it "almost entirely disappeared as a
body."

strategically, the Federals had fought poorly.

Due

to a flagrant deficiency In the Federal communications,
buell's corps commanders neglected to report the engagement
until four o'clock on the day of the battle.454

Sending less

than two-thirds of his 60,000 man army into the engagement,
buell allowed victory to slip from his grasp as the hands
of 10,000 Confederates.
Through the benefit of captured enemy information, the
night of October 8 brought bragg the startling news of the
odds against which his army nad been fighting.
later stated:

As Wheeler

. . i-erryville was not a proper place for

sixteen thousand men to form and wait the choice of time
and manner of attack by buell

.

•

”
.05

The only alternative

63. Connelly, Army of the Heartland, 2651 Wheeler,
Nbragg's Invasion," 16-17; Oh., Ser. I, Vol. XVI. pt. 1, 1121,
1110-11, 1157-59: Hambleton Tapp, "The battle of Perryville,
1862" The Filson Club historical Quarterly, IX (July, 1935).
158-81; haiph A. Wooster, "Confederate Success at Perryville,"
Register of the Kentucky Historical society, LIX (October,

t961), 318=23.
04. Due to what Buell later referred to as "configuration of the ground," the sounds of the battle did not reach
his headquarters, ten miles to the west of the battlefield.
6er. I, Vol. XVI. pt. 1, 51, 1027.
OR
05. Wheeler, "Bragg's Invasion," 15. bragg received
the information of Federal strength from captured prisoners
and the accidental discovery of McCook's papers and baggage.
Oh.. 6er. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 1, 1121; Johnston Diary, October
17-1862, Johnston Papers.
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to destruction was retreat.

Bragg, Polk and Hardee concurred;

:unction with Kirby Smith had too long been delayed.
Early on October 9, Buell, expecting the battle to resume.
ordered Thomas to attack with the Federal right that had been
denied action the day before.

At daybreak, and with victory

in sight, the blue columns moved upon the battlefield only
to discover the Rebels en route to Harrodsburg, their point
of concentration.66
During the days prior to the Perryville battle, Kirby
Smith was concentrating his forces near Lawrenceburg for a
projected encounter with the enemy force in that direction.
On October 7 he was informed that an enemy force of 20,000
was crossing the river at Frankfort.

To meet this threat

he informed Bragg that he planned to send two brigades under
Churchill and Withers around to the enemy's rear.

The com-

mander then planned to move with the remainder of his force
upon the enemy's front.

If the Federals retreated before

the ninth, the Army of Kentucky would move toward Buell's
rear or flank.

Hoping for a decisive victory. Kirby Smith

advanced toward Lawrenceburg or. October 9 and unsuccessfully
engaged Sill at Dry Ridge.

In reporting the situatior to

Bragg, Kirby Smith displayed his degree of confusion by informing his commander that McCook might be moving toward
Buell's support at Perryville.67

66.

OR.,

Kirby Smith must have been

Ser. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 1, 1027.

67. Ibid., 920, 925, 927;
Kirby Smith," No. 5, 70-71.

Hammond, "The Campaign of

a<

astonished to learn, upon receiving orders to concentrate
at Harrodsburg, that "the battle for Kentucky" had been
fought without his knowledge.
Kirby Smith's urmy reached Harrodsburg on October 10
only to find the rear of the Confederate main force in departure for Bryantsville.

At Harrodsburg, Kirby Smith and

Bragg conferred for the third time during the campaign.
During the conference, Bragg received information that the
enemy was approaching from the south along the Perryville
road.

To avoid a flank attack, Bragg ordered Polk to halt

and form into line of battle along the Bryantsville road.
Kirby Smith was ordered to take position west of Harrods68
burg across the Salt River.
Kirby Smith later reported that it was through his
lnsistance that Bragg formed into battle line.

"For God's

sake, General," Kirby Smith was to have implored, "let us
fight here.

I believe that without a command even, our men

would run over Buell's army • • • •"
plieu, "1 will do it sir.

Bragg was to have re-

Select your position, put your

men in lint of battle and I will countermarch my column."'"
Although most unlikely, this dramatization has led to the
mistaken contention that Bragg, upon leaving the Harrodsburg
defense line, cowered in the face of certain victory.

68.
69.
Papers.

Hammond, "me Campalwn of Kirby smith," No.

5, 70-1,

Kirby Smith, "Kentucky Campaign Notes," Kirby smith

ordering Kirby Smith to evacuate the Frankfort-Versailles
line, Bragg had uncovered the supply depot at Lexington.
His obvious move was toward Bryantsville, the last remaining Confederate supply depot in Kentucky.

By moving from

Perryville, through Danville, to Bryantsville, the most
direct route. Bragg would have allowed the enemy to move
northward from Perryville toward Harrosdburg, thus cutting
the Coufederate forces in two.

By moving toward Harrods-

burg, Bragg proposed to prevent this.

He had not planned

to give battle at Harrodsburg, and probably did not even
intend to stop there.

His only intentions were to avoid the

splitting of Ms forces and to join with Kirby Smith.

Once

these objectives were attained, Bragg planned to move the
entire Confederate force to the base at Bryantsville where
battle plans could be made.

At Harrodsburg, Bragg

WAF

forced

to set his army into line of battle to avoid a flank attack
from the approaching Federal columns.

The battle position

at Harrodsburg, despite Kirby Smith's insistance to the contrary, was not advantagous.

The Confederates would have

oeen forced to fight with the Kentucky river at their backs
and to surrender the vital supplies at Bryantsville.

Bragg

also received information that Dumont's force was advancing
from Frankfort and threatening to cross the Kentucky River
in his rear.

Once Bragg received information that Buell

had turned southwardly of the Perryville road toward Danville, he immediately—and wisely--put his army into motion
toward Bryantsville.

The contention that Bragg lost his

nerve at Harrodsburg is without basis.7°
rhe situation at bryantsville was i-7.r1m indeed; it
offered
one of the greatest disappointments of the campa
ign.

Gn

aeptember 27, bragg had ordered all supplies at
Danville and
Lexington to be concentrated at Hryantsville and
Camp Dick
r
. .ubinson, but the quartermaster corps had failed to
curry
out the orders.

Only four day's rations were stored at the

Hryantsville depot when the Confederate army
arrived.71
Lacking sufficient supplies to take the offensive
and with
Lsuell's army reported in nearly every direction,
bragg decided
to retreat from the uncooperative state when he recei
ved the
discouraging information that Price and Van Dorn
had ueen
defeated at Corinth.72
With this defeat, bragg commanded the only effective
Confederate military force between the Appalacian
s and the
Xississippi.

He remembered Davis' order not to risk the loss

70. Connelly, Army of the Heartland, 2b8-G9. For the
more popular opinion that bragg cowered at Harrodsbur
g, see
Parks, Kirby amith, 237; Horn, Army of rennessee,
187; Parks,
Polk, 373-74; Hammond, "the Campaign of Kiruy amith,"
No. 5,
7172; Cnumney, "buell," 177; Williams, Lincoln Finds a General, IV, 136-37; Nathaniel Cheairs Hu6ne
s, Jr. General
William J, Hardee, Old heliaule (baton houge,
19L-5), 133.
for an account of these activities from a Feder
al viewpoint,
see, OR , aer. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 1, 52-4. bragg may
have also
considered the possibility of a Federal advance
from Cincinnati,
which was being organized. Iuid., pt. 2,
603; bid., pt. 1,
1093.
71. OR., der. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 2, 6.131
"The Campaign of Kirby amith," o. 5, 74.

Hammond,

72. The Corinth defeat was reported in the
Cincinnati
En4u1rer on October b, uut it is generally assum
ed that Bragg
did not receive the information until October
12 at bryantsville. Gee, McWhiney, Hrag, 321.

of his army; retreat from Kentucky seemed the only alternative to such disaster.
I.ollowing some deliberation, nragg's subordinate officers
.entucky, and plans
delivered a unanimous vote to retreat from 74
were initiated at once.73

With Cumberland Gap as the objec-

tive. Kirby Smith marched via Big Hill while Bragg retreated
along the Crab Orchard-Mount Vernon route.
Although Buell did not effectively press the demoralized
Confederates, the retreat for Kirby Smith was long and hard.
The ascent of Big Hill was extremely difficult for the wagon
trains.

rhroughout the trip, most of the Army of Kentucky

was employed foraging for food.74

Kirby Smith arrived in

Knoxville on October 26, tired and discouraged.

With the

failure of the Kentucky campaign behind him, he concentrated
on his departmental duties.

73. Although, at first, Kirby smith disagreed, he later
reported to J. ,Aoddard Johnston; ". . . under these circumstances I should no longer oppose LBragg'R7 determination."
Kirby Smith to J. Stoddard Johnston, October 31, 1862, Johnston
Papers.
74.

Oh , ser. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 2,

975.

CHAPTER FIVE

ANALYSIS
The campaign ended in nearly complete failure.

Having

entered Kentucky with the hopes of capturing the state and
driving the invading Federals from the deep South, Bragg
and Yirby Smith were forced to suffer a seemingly humiliating retreat.

In a last desperate attempt to seize triumph

from disgrace, Kirby Smith, on October 17, asked Polk:

"Can-

not we unite and end this disastrous retreat by a glorious
victory?"1

But the troops were jaded, divided, and demoral-

ized.
The Confederate commanders rationalized the campaign
as a success by citing the fear that was struck in the North,
the southern initiative in the campaign, the importance of
delaying Federal advancements into the South, and the amount
of supplies captured; but the direct results were negative.
The Federal army was still undaunted, the pro-Confederate
government was forced to flee Kentucky, -And recruiting was
9

scant.-

The rationalization that Bragg and Kirby Smith left
Kentucky with enough supplies to make the campaign a worthwhile effort is a standard myth.

As late as the end of

October, Bragg's superiors were asking why he had left Ken-

1.
2.
Notes,"
162.

OR.,

Ser. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 2, 959.

Ibid., pt. 1, 1094. Kirby Smith, "Kentucky Campaign
Kirby Smith Papers; Vandiver, Their Tattered Flags,

Q9
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tucky with his army so well supplied.

Actually, the Confed-

erate soldiers were nearer to starvation.

Although Bragg's

trains were reported to be forty-five miles long,
a large
number were filled with guns to arm the expected 20,000
Kentucky recruits.

Kirby :Dmith reported that "not less than

10,000 Llif his men were7
_ scattered through the country trying to find something upon which to live."

The next day, he

informed Bragg that his men were "worn down from
exposure
and luck of food."

This is hardly the report of a commander

at the head of extensive supply trains.3
As the columns reached tneir destinations in MiCcUe
Tennessee, a critical clamor began that, within a year,
would
upset the entire organization of the western department.

As

each officer attempted to lead the finger of blame away
from
himself, Bragg became the center of censure and the
chief
scapegoat of the campaign; Polk and Hardee became
the leading critics.

They openly exhibited their discontent over

the outcome of the campaign and their dislike for
Bragg.
Polk stated that Bragg had lost the respect of his men,
and, concerning Bragg's attempt to prove that Polk
had disobeyed orders at Bardstown, Polk Informed riardee that the
"implied censure

. . lacks foundation and fails."

Not

accepting Hardee's offer to "rip up the campaign L7.4-47 tear
Bragg to tatters,"4 Polk would wait for another time
to

3. Connelly and Jones, Politics of Command,
:3er. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 2, 975.

77;

Ch.,

4. Ibid., \dol. XVIII, pt. 2, 6.32-33;
William Polk,
Leonidas Polk, Bishop and .;eneral (2 vols., New
York, 1915),
II, 165; OR., 6er. I, Vol. XVI,
Pt. 1, 1103, 109b.
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assist in pressuring Bragg from command.
The most serious outcome of the Kentucky campaign was
the formation of an anti-Bragg coalition.

This dissident

association was led by Polk and Hardee, but was reinforced
by oisenchanted Kentuckians.

They felt that their home state

would offer more to the Confederate cause if again invaded
under a more aggressive commander, General Joseph E. Johnston
in particular.

Breckinridge led the influential Kentuckians

in this opinion, followed by Buckner. Morgan, Marshall, Hawes,
and various other persuasive personalities.5
The anti-Bragg group grew numerically and became more
vocal following the Murfreesboro campaign.

But Davis' faith

in Bragg, coupled with a relocation of several of the more
vocal members, quelled the opposition throughout the summer
of 1863.

Despite Bragg's September victory at Chickamauga,

the opposition faction rose again, adding another influential
commander to its ranks, Ic.aor General James Lonastreet.

In

an attempt to throw their entire influence into a single demand for Bragg's removal, the anti-Brarp dissidents destroyed
themselves.

Davis sided with Bragg on the heated issue.

The

opposition commanders were relocated or demoted, and much of

5. The anti-Bragg faction is used here as a collective
term to include three anti-Bragg coalitions; the Kentucky
bloc, composed of influential Kentuckians, both military and
political, basically concerned with gaining Kentucky for the
Confederacy; the Albigdon-Colombia bloc, composed of the members of the gilliam Preston family; and the anti-Bragg bloc,
composed of EraFF's corps commanders. Connelly and Jores,
Politics of Command, 55-72; McWhiney, Bragg, 374-392; Davis,
Breckinridge, 350-362.
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the western department was reorganized.b
because of his transfer to the Trans-Mississippi, Kirby
..dmith was not an active participant in the anti-bragE movements,
but he certainly sympathized with its objective.

Possessing

a somewhat restrained personality, it is surprising that the
initial and some of the most severe bits of criticism came
from Kirby Smith.

Following the campaign, betn wrote of

Kirby Smith's opinion that brags "had lost his mind" and that
Kirby Smith intended to "so state in his report to Mr. Davis."7
Although never published, Kirby Smith's report evidently did
not contain the extreme accusation, owing apparently to a
cooled temper and a reconciliatory meeting in hichmond with
1)ragg. Polk, and Davis.

Kirby Smith was content to enter Into

his personal notes his various disagreements and objections
to bragg's conduct at particular points during the campaign.
The criticisms lire of no surprise.

Kirby bmith censured oragg

for not fighting at Cave City, Munfordville, and Burrodsburg.
He also found bragg guilty of allowing buell to enter Louisville, for being misinformed as to the enemy's location prior
to the Perryville battle, and for leaving Kentucky in the
face of an "Inferior force largely made up of new levies."
Kirby Smith refused to cooperate with Bragg in the Mur1reesbora campaign until strongly persuaded by Davis and even tnen
cooperation was indifferent at best.

As Kirby Smith was

b. Connelly and Jones, Politics of Command, 71-72; Parks,
Folk, 343-44.

7.

Morrison, "Heth," 23-24.

107
rapidly progressing toward a leadership position in
the informal anti-Bragg coalition, he was transferred to the
TransMississippi on March 7. 1863.8
The importance of the anti-Bragg coalition was that it
arose from the controversies of the Kentucky campaign, and
that it hampered Bragg's activities throughout 1863.

Bragg

attacked his opposition in a near-neurotic manner; at times
he became totally ..)bsessed with the delegation of blame
to
his subordinates.

Following the Kentucky campaign, Polk

and Breckinridge became Bragg's most frequent scapeg
oats.
This censure intensified following Murfreesboro, ac both
generals failed to meet Bragg's prescribed commands.

These

firey criticisms led to frequent accusatory letters to
Davis
by both Bragg and his opponents.

These correspondences caused

many to believe that Bragg was more concerned with winnin
g
a battle in Richmond than on the battlefield, and the commander became increasingly unpopular.9
Despite his victory at Chickamauga, Bragg was again
branded as a loser for not pursuing the defeated enemy.
Having been victorious over his subordinate generals, he
resigned his command shortly afterward, evidently satisfied
that he had effectively vindicated himself.

However, the

8.

Kirby Smith, "Kentucky Campaign Notes," Kirby Smith
See also, Kirby Smith to J. Stoddard Johnston, October
31, /866, Johnston Papers; OR., Ser. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 2, 975;
Jefferson Davis to Kirby Smith, October 29, 1862, Kirby Smith
Papers; OR., Ser. I, Vol. XXII, pt. 2. 787.
Papers.

9.

Connelly and Jones, Politics of Command, 63-64: Davis,
Breckinridge, 351-54; OR., Ser. I, Vol. XXX, pt. 4, 705-70
6;
ibid., Vol. LII, pt. 27726.
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various historical works and reminiscences

at followed the

war tended to portray Bragg as a cowardly harlequin, or, at
test, an overly cautious misfit.

The anti-Bragg idea has con-

tinued on through the works of Stanley F. Horn, Joseph H.
Parks and others with relentless censure and pungent criticism."
Bragg is certainly open to criticism, yet more modern
research has tended to exhonorate him to a great degree.
With increased historical emphasis on command organization
and logistical planning, Bragg has emerged as a more competent
commander than previously credited.

Extended study of his

decisions and decision making processes has developed a second opinion of Bragg, and projected the Confederate commander
into a more favorable light.

Although still portrayed as

cautious and non-aggressive, Bragg is no longer isolated as
the South's supreme example of ignorance and cowardice.11
As one of Bragg's chief critics, Kirby Smith has recently
been delegated the role of villlin and disrupter of the
Kentucky scheme.

Although this may be partially correct,

there seems to be a necesFity among historians to place the
entire blame upon the shoulders of one participant.12

Al-

though both Bragg and Kirby Smith exhibited various command

10. See particularly, Duke. Reminiscences; Parks, Kirby
Smith; Parks, Polk; Polk, Polk.
11. Among these works are: McWhiney, Bragg; Connelly,
Army of the Heartland; Jones, Confederate Strategy; Connelly
and Jones, Politics of Command; Williams, Lincoln Finds a
General, IV; McWhiney, "Controversy."
12. Among Kirby Smith's critics are: Mcwhiney, 11122Eg;
McWhirey, "Controversy;" Connelly, Army of the Heartland.
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weaknesses, neither can be held totally responsible /or the
failure of the campaign.

beyond the common generalization

that the commanders are the bearers of responsibility despite
the outcome of the operation, the failures in Kentucky can
be attributed to several reasons.
It is difficult to isolate one major cause of the Kentucky failure, but insufficient cooperation and lack of Kentky recruits are certainly the two most important factors.
lee outcome ::f* the campaign was contingent upon the success
k..1

these two elements, and from Bragg's attempts to initiate

accomplishments in both recruitment an

cooperation, it is

apparent that he was fully aware of the consequences of failure in both of these areas.
rhe Confederate defeat at Corinth can be viewed as the
conclusive ,Ispects of bragg's decision to forego the Kentucky
scheme.

Without an effective force to occupy the Federal

armies In northern Mississippi and Alabama, Kentucky occupation could not produce any lasting effect.

As commander of

the only Confederate army in the West with any semblance of
strength, and faced with sundry other disappointing problems,
Bragg took the President's Advice not to risk his army and
retreated from Kentucky.
On the luestion of confused priorities, the campaipn
suflered immensely.

at several junctures throughout the

campaign, a joining of the two forces was postponed to pursue
lesser activities.

Most of the diversions from the basic

plan were not of small importance such as the pursuit of
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George Morgan, the proposed attack in Cincinnati, and the
inauguration of Hawes; but in allowing their importance to
outweigh the necessary combination of armies, the commanding generals made several errors.
Serious confusion developed between the Confederate
field commanders and the Richmond hierarchy.

Chief among

these problems was the weakness of Jefferson Davis' command
system.

In designating the invasion as a "cordial cooperation"

between the two Confederate forces, the President gave Kirby
Smith the power to dictate the early movements of the campaign.

Without the authority to directly order Kirby Smith's

moves, Bragg was, several times, subjected to compromise.
True, Kirby Smith succumbed to Bragg's orders once the two
forces came to within supporting distance in the Bluegrass,
but prior to that, Bragg was faced with the responsibility of
placing his force between Buell and Kirby Smith.

Although

the first movements of the invasion were generally successful, a more harmonious advance might have been initiated had
Bragg received full command over both armies.
Throughout the campaign, the Richmond authorities continually meddled in the affairs of the Department of the Mississippi without Bragg's knowledge.

Bragg placed Major General

Sam Jones in command of Chattanooga during the Kentucky invasion.

Kirby Smith left McCown in command at the East

Tennessee headquarters at Knoxville, but on September 20,
McCown was ordered to Kirby Smith's aid at Lexington.

With-

out notifying Bragg, the Richmond authorities ordered Jones
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to take command in East Tennessee.

Ignorant of the changes,

Bragg ordered Jones to take command in Middle Tennessee.

In

an attempt to satisfy both of his superiors, Jones asked
Richmond to combine both Middle and East Tennessee Into one
department under nis command.

The reluest was granted, and--

despite Bragg's elimination from the decision--the reorganization seemed a sound compromise until Jones received visions
of grandure.

With an evident desire to lead his own army,

Jones delayed or detained various reinforcements en route to
Kentucky.

The most astounding aspect of this arrangement is

that required approval from Richmond was granted beyond Bragg's
knowledge.13
Further reorganization of Department Number Two was
deemed necessary when on October 1--again without Bragg's
knowledge--Davis created the Department of Mississippi and
Eastern Louisiana.

Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton

was given the command with the objective of liberating New
Orleans.14

The failure of these nearly autonomous commanders

to support Bragg was instrumental in his decision to abandon
Kentucky.
In light of many of Bragg's actions it is evident that
he did not understand Kentuckians.

Bragg certainly under-

stood the reasons for the failure of the Kentucky campaign,
including the necessity of a sizable Kentucky enlistment,
but he could never quite understand why the men of the state

13.

OR., Ser. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 2. 852, 866, 916, 920-30.

1.4.

Ibid.,

Vol. XVII, pt. 2. 716-17.
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would not flock to his side.
other states of the Union.

Kentucky was unique among the

Not only was Kentucky a border

state, but it had recently evolved into a situation that
owed economic reliance to both sections of the country.
Prior to 1830, Kentucky was basically southern in nearly all
aspects:

politics, history, economics, geography and pop-

ulation.

As best explained by one of the state's most noted

historians, Kentucky was "forced to look southward through
the course of the Mississippi River . .

•K15

After 1850,

with the ad ent of the Erie Canal and the railroad, Kentucky
began to expand northward economically.

Northern investors

began to tap the rich Bluegrass, as Kentucky became more and
more linked to both the North and the South with much to
lose by abandoning either section.16
Politically, Kentucky mixed a strong state rights sentiment with an intense regard for Federal authority without the
problems of contridiction.

In voting for John Bell in 1860.

Kentucky portrayed little political similarity with the
North beyond a desire to preserve the Union.17
Many Confederate sympathizers in Kentucky wisely feared
a massive blue invasion from Illinois, Indiana and Ohio should
the state secede.18

15. Coulter, Civil War and Readjustment. 9.
16.

Ibid., 8-11.

17.

Ibid., 7-8, ?4.

18. Ibid., 11. This suspicion was particularly strong
in the Bluegrass, quelling much of the southern sympathy there.
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'41tri the economy in a northerly shift and with a basic
desire by the majority to preserve the Union, Kentuckians,
by 1862, needed more than the presence of a Confederate column
to convince them of the necessity to come to the aid of the
southern cause.

Unable to determine tnis, both Bragg and

Kirby Omith expected the Kentuckians to rise up against the
occupying Federal columns.

Kentuckians conversely expected

a show of force; tney wanted an exnibition of permanency of
the invasion before aid and recruits would be delivered.

In

attempting to install hawes as tne Confederate governor of
Kentucky, Bragg was evidently attempting to display this bit
of necessary permanency, although he was certainly more concerned with implementing a conscription act.

Indecisive Ken-

tuckians miejlt h;lve succumbed to conscription, but before a
sizable number of recruits would navp come forward, a Federal
defeat would have been necessary, and even then Kentucky may
not have been as willing to rise as the Confederate generals
had expected.
Although brags was unable to understand Kentucky's position, Kirby omith exhibited more of an insight to the question
when he implored i5ragg to attack Buell below Louisville on the
premise that the Federal commander "has always been the great
bugbear to these people and until defeated we cannot hope
for much ad !
- ition to our ranks from Kentucky." 19

Conceiv-

ably merely an attempt to coerce Bragg into attacking Buell

19.

Cp.., oer. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 2, 066.
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below Lousiville, Kirby Smith left no othe
r account tnat he
considered Buell's defeat a necessity to the
success of the
Kentucky campaign.
Just as lack of Kentucky support can be listed as
a cause
for the failure of the campaign, reliance upon
this support
can be named as a significant command erro
r that caused hragg's
eventual retreat.

As early as April 1861 when John Hunt Morgan

informed Davis that "twenty thousand men can
be raised Lin
Kentuckx7 to defend Southern liberty agai
nst northern conquest," Kentucky had been regarded by
the South as an untapped
reservoir of recruits.

It Is of course difficult to determine

that this particular statement misled Lay'
s' concept of Kentucky's sentiment, but the President was
certainly in error
on the subject.

Following the campaign, Davis wrcte:

"The

expectation that the Kentuckians would
rise en masse with the
coming of a force which would allow them
to do

so

•

•

. has

been sadly disappo1ntjna7. w20
Following the summer raid of his home state
In 1662,
Morgan penned a similar message to Kirby
Smith in Knoxville.
Morgan's insistence that "25,000 or 30,000
men will join you
at once," was a definite factor In the deci
sion for a major
invasion of Kentucky.21 heyond Morgan's prej
udiced invitations, Lavis, bragg, and Kirby Smith were
paalcally ignorant
of what to expect in Kentucky.

Yet they were willing to

4.0.

Ibid., Vol. LII, pt. 2, 46;

21.

Qh,.

howland Davis, V, 25b.

er. I, Vol. XVI, pt. 2, 733-.34.

base the contingent factor of Kentucky enlistments upon the
receptions given to a hometown hero In an undefended region.
;his proved to be the gravest error o! the invading commanders
and led to one of the major reasons for the Confederate retreat.
The Kentucky campaign had great promise, but it Is often
only cited as a Confederate diversionary tactic In favor of
Lee's more spectacular invasion of Maryland.

Had Bragg and

Kirby smith defeated the Federal army, their offensive possibilities would have been virtually limitless.

Penetration

beyond the chio iliver might have been feasible in some form.
This accomplishment might easily have generated foreign recognition.

If, as Is becoming more popularly believed, the

war was lost in the West, the Kentucky campaign was certainly
a major part of the Confederate defeat.
Kirby 6mith's part of the campaign is generally viewed
as supportive, but he was also the spearhead and was a major
force behind the 5.ntelligence of the grand strategy.

Al-

though proving to serve no lasting military value, his swift
penetration into the Kentucky heartland struck fear into the
hearts and minds of the North.

Yet his exertion of indepen-

dence often forced Jragg to readjust his plans to protect the
younger commander.
Through better efforts to cooperate and more efficient
communications and logistics planning a united Confederate
force certainly might have been more successful.

However,

without Kentucky's favorable sentiment and numerous enlist-
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ments, victory would only have been temporary.
Exhibiting a ferociously ambitious attitude, Kirby Smith
rose from his mediocre position in East Tennessee in an attempt
to Fain personal glory and recoFnition only to come to an
early and embarrassing downfall due partially to a surprisingly timid attitude.

No longer displaying his fervor for

enthusiasm and ambition, he allowed himself to become, by
early October, a sideline figure in the wake of Bragg's attempt
to consolidate interests and armies.

Misled and confused,

Kirby Smith found himself not only absent from the campaign's
major battle, but adding to the confusion that sent three misinformed commanders and 16,000 Confederate troops against
60,000 Federals at Perryville.

CRITICAL ESSAY ON SOURCES

It is difficult to pinpoint the most important source
for this study.

Yet The War of the Rebellions

A Compilation

of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies
(Washington, 1880-1901). 126 vols., should be mentioned above
all others.

Without this vast amount of original material a

study of this nature would have been considerably more difficult, if not impossible.
,t devote
Also important were three secondary sources th.
considerable space to Kirby Smith, and the campaign of 1862.
The only modern biography of Kirb:r Smith is Joseph H. Parks,
General Edmund Kirby Smith. C.S.A. (Baton Rouge, 1954).

Parks

sees Kirby Smith as nearly incapable of error while he relentlessly condemns Bragg at every turn.

Despite this and other

shortcomings, the work provided an excellent starting point for
this study.

To balance Park's one-sided interpretation there

is Grady McWhiney, Braxton Bragg and the Confederate Defeat
(New York. 1969).

On the often argued question of who was to

blame for the failure of the campaign, McWiney points his
finger at Kirby Smith.

Somewhere in-between is Thomas Lawrence

Connelly, Army of the Heartland (Baton Rouge, 1967).

Connelly

is more concerned with the other factors that contributed to
the failure of the campaign, and less insistent upon placing
the blame on either Kirby Smith or Bragg.

This solid work

offers the best interpretation of the Kentucky campaign.
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Several manuscript collections were instrumental in the
completion of this study.

Of foremost importance was the col-

lection of Kirby Smith Papers (Southern Collection, University
of North Carolina).

Included in this collection are many im-

portant personal letters, and an unpublished manuscript of
Kirby Smith's account of the Kentucky campaign.

Also of con-

siderable use were the J. Stoddard Johnston Papers (Manuscript
Division, The Filson Club Historical Society).

Johnston served

on Bragg's staff throughout the Kentucky campaign and collected
considerable information in his diary.

Several important

letters are also included in the collection.

Also at The

Filson Club is the collection of Humphrey Marshall Papers,
and a small Kirby Smith collection.

Two important collections

of Braxton Bragg papers aided in the study.

They are:

The

David Bullock Harris Collection (Manuscript Division, Duke
University) and the William P. Palmer Collection (Western
Reserve Historical Society).

Together these collections con-

tain most of Bragg's correspondences dealing with the Kentucky
campaign.

Other manuscript material on the Kentucky invasion

can be found in Special Collections at the University of
Kentucky.
Of the published primary sources used in this study, Paul
F. Hammon, "General Kirby Smith's Campaign in Kentucky in 1862."
Southern Historical Society Papers, IX -X (1881), 225-33, 246-54,

289-97, 455-62, (vol. X) 70-76, was of considerable importance.
This is the only eyewitness account of Kirby Smith's campaign
in published form.

It is less than authoritative, but the
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source proved to be very useful.

In Robert U. Johnson and

Clarence C. Buell, ed., Battles and Leaders of the Civi: Wars
Being for the Most Part Contributed by Union and Confederate
Officers (New York, 1884-88), 4 vols., several writings by
participants in the campaipn make for an important and readily available primary source.

The accounts of Joseph Wheeler,

Don Carlos Buell, Georpe !organ, and David Urquhart were useful, but they are the cause of the development of the standard
myths that dot the pages of the works of Stanley F. Horn and
Joseph H. Parks.

Caution is the word of advice here.

The

often overlooked career of a capable commander is brought to
light by James L. Morrison, "The Civil War Letters of Henry
Meth," Civil War History, VII (Jan. 1962), 9-24.

Several other

printed primary sources proved to be of less importance.
are:

They

James B. Fry, Operations of the Army Under Buell from

June 10th to October 30th, 1862, and the Buell Commission
(New York, 1884);

William R. Boggs, Military Reminiscences of

General William R. Boggs, C.S.A. (Durham, 1913);

John P. Jones,

A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, Earl Schenck, ed. (New York, 1958);
Basil Duke, Reminscerces of Basil Duke (New York, 1931);
M. Moore, ed., Rebellion Record:

Frank

A Diary of American Events

with Documents, Narratives, Illustrative Incidents, Poetry,
Etc. (New York, 1861-68). 11 vols.;

Department of the Interior,

Bureau of Census, Ninth Census of the United Sta,es: 1870.
Wealth and Industry (Washington, 18''2);

Dunbar Rowland, Jeffer-

son Davis, Constitutionalist; His Letters. Papers and Speeches
(Jackson, Miss., 1926), 10 vols.;

John T. Wilder, "Seige of

16
Munfordville," in Samual Cole Williams, John T. Wilder, Commander of the Lightening Brigade (Bloomington, 1936).

Also

in this category is the aforementioned The War of the Rebellion.
Several newspapers proved useful.

As the major organ of

the Confederacy, the Richmond Dispatch should be mentioned above
all others.

Other newspapers used were the Nashville Dispatch,

'ew York Tribune, New York Herald, Louisville Journal, Cincinnati
Enquirer, and the Richmond Kentucky Register.

The later is

a modern newspaper in which an important letter dealing with
the battle of Richmond was published in 1967.

As might be ex-

pected the newspapers of the period often copied from one anr, ard were filled with inaccuracies, but they stayed well

ot

formed on the Kentucky invasion and were often quite percepto its importance.
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Several participants i
come
Jof,7eph

the Kentucky campaign were to be-

biographical study.

Already mentioned are

r—ks, Kirby Smith, and Grady

cWhiney, Braxton Bragg.

The only modern biography of Buell is J.R. Chumney, Jr., "Don
Carlos Bv,e11, Gentleman General," (doctoral dissertation, Rice

university. '964).

Although Chumney makes little effort to

ir erptzt the Kentucky campaign--and in fact devotes little
time T.o it--the work is significant for a Union look at the
events.

On Leonidas Polk, there is Joseph H. Parks, General

Leonidas Polk. The Fighting Bishop (Baton Rouge, 1962).

Parks,

in the tradition of his volume on Kirby Smith, is highly critical
of Bragg and exalts Kirby Smith, Polk, and Hardee to nearly

i1 7

unbelievable heights.

Also on Polk is the general's son.

William Polk, Leonidas Polk; Bishop and General (New York,
1915), 2 vols.

On John Hunt Morgan there is the important

work by Cecil Fletcher Holland, !organ and His Raiders (New
York, 1942).

Also in the cavalier category is Robert Selph

Henry, First With the Most:

Forrest (Indianapolis, 1944).

Although somewhat out of date, this work is still useful.
Several other authoritative biographies are:

Robert G. Hartje,

Van Dorn; The Life and Times of a Confederate General (Nashville
1967);

William C. Davis, Breckirridge: Statesman, Soldier,

Symbol (Baton Rouge, 1974);

Arndt Stickles, Simon Bolivar

Buckner; Borderland Knight (Chapel Hill, 1940): and Nathaniel
Cheairs Hughes, Jr., General William J. Hardee; Old Reliable
(Baton Rouge, 1965).
Several works were helpful in dealing with specific topics
of the campaign.

On the Confederate system of departmental

organization there is the innovative Thomas Lawrence Connelly
and Archer Jones, Politics of Command (Baton Rouge, 1973).
This work, together with Davis' excellent biography of John
Breckinridge, was instrumertal in analyzing the movement that
formed following the campaign to oust Bragg from his military
position.

On the somewhat neglected topic of the Corinth

campaign, and the movements of Price and Van Dorn in the Southwest, there is only the above-mentioned biography of Van Dorn
by Robert G. Nartje.

The Confederate railroad system and its

importance is skillfully explored in Robert C. Black III,
Railroads of the Confederacy (Chapel Hill, 1Q52).

Grady
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McWhiney discusses some specific asnects of command in
"Controversy in Kentucky," Civil War History, VI (Mar. 1Q60).
5-42.

On the questioned authorship of the J. Stoddard Johnston

Diary (there are two, one at The Filson Club and one in the
Palmer Collection) there is June I. Gow, "The Johnston and Brent
Diaries:

A Problem of Authorship," Civil War History, XIV

(Mar. 1968). 46-50.

Miss Gow, a student of McWhiney, concludes

that the Johnston Diary at The Filson Club is the authentic
of the two.

She correctly criticizes Thomas Lawrence Connelly

for using both diaries (they cover the same period of time
and are contradictory) in his Army of the Heartland.
Of the several works that look at the campaign as part
of a larger work on military history, there are two that stand
out:

Archer Jones, Confederate Strategy from Shiloh to Vicks-

burg (Baton Rouge, 1961); and Kenneth P. Williams, Lincoln
Finds a General; A Military Study of the Civil War (New York,

1956), 5 vols.

Also in this category is Stanley F. Horn, Army

of Tennessee (Norman, Okla.. 1955).

Horn might be considered

the modern founder of the anti-Bragg school.

He was the first

to give historical credit to the myths that were expounded in
the post-Civil War years by Basil Duke, William Polk, and
others.

7_wo others to be considered are:

Douglas Southall

Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants; A Study in Command (New York, 1042);
and Frank E. Vandiver, Their Tattered Flags; The Epic of the
Confederacy (New York, 1970).

The above-mentioned Thomas Lawrence

Connelly and Archer Jones, Politics of Command is also to be
included in this category.
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On Perryville there is Hambleton Tarr, "The Battle of
Perryville. 1862,"
1935), 158-81;
Perryville,"

The Filson Club History Quarterly, IX (July,

Ralph A. Wooster, "Con'ederate Success at

Register of the Kentucky Historical Society,

LIX (Oct. 1961), - 18-23.
The most important work or Kentucky during the Civil War
y
is E. Merton Coulter, Civil War arid Readjustment in Kentuck
Chapel Hill, 1926).

Coulter is particularly useful on the

politics of the campaign, but offers little on its military
asrects.

J. Stoddard Johrston, "Kentucky," as part of the

Preater Thomas Yoseloff, ed., Confederate Military History
(New York, 1962; first published, 1899), 12 vols., is out of
date, bias, and consequently neglected, but offers an inters
pretation that is not far removed from the more modern writing
of Connelly and Y.cWhiney.

The standard history of Kentucky

is Thomas D. Clark, A History of Kentucky (Lexington, 1937).
Clark does little more than rewrite Coulter, although some
useful information is available.

